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ABSTRACT 
 
Scenes of The Turbulent Days: On The 1930s Chinese Leftist Film Movement 
 
by 
 
Cui Zhou 
 
In this master thesis, I focus on a controversial historical movement—the 1930s’ Chinese 
Leftist Film Movement (1932-1937) to study its development, function, main characteristics 
and influence. I argue that in the 1930s because of the serious national crisis, shared circular 
history of the community and various discussions on cultural values, Chinese intellectuals in 
the film field transformed their transcendences, which might more or less contain a radical 
tendency, into a dialogical degree. The dialogical transcendence also contributed to the 
formation of a public space in the film field. Conversely, the public space promoted the 
transformation of the transcendence. Thanks to the effect of the dialogical transcendence, 
discussion and negotiation became an effective method to address social issues. Chinese film 
production also changed in this situation. More and more filmmakers turned to concentrate 
on portraying social issues. Cinematic strategies like an open ending, which could encourage 
and broaden the engagement of discussion, were employed in the 1930s film practice. 
Accordingly, in the 1930s film texts, various discourses and multiple truths coexisted. 
Being a component of the 1930s film practice, the leftist film movement shared a similar 
tolerance to alien discourses. On the other hand, it also had its specific distinctiveness. 
Relying on discussion and negotiation, intellectuals achieved a comparative consensus and 
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drew a framework with two core principles for leftist film production: exposing social 
darkness and looking for an alternative modernity. In this framework, various attitudes and 
expressing forms were acceptable. The constitution of participants in this movement was 
complex. Some filmmakers took an active part in it; but some might be passively selected 
because their particular texts could fit in this framework.  In addition to filmmakers, 
intellectuals in the printing press field were also engaged. Some of their film reviews showed 
a trend to guide film interpretation to a particular political perspective, even though as 
cultural texts, leftist films are open to diverse interpretations. In this sense, the leftist film 
movement actually was in a canonization process 
I use two leftist film cases: Street Angel and Big Road to concretely analyze the different 
cinematic strategies used by filmmakers to expose social issues and express their inclination 
to an alternative modernity, like using the POV to fix the audiences’ identities and the 
dynamic object/subject relationship between male and female characters. The two films also 
construct allegories to educate the masses to be modern subjects. 
Although leftists and the members of the Chinese Communist Part (CCP) took part in this 
movement and worked as influential roles, the CCP’s ideology cannot completely and 
perfectly explain the whole process and cultural meanings of this movement. Nevertheless, as 
open texts with a mission to look for an alternative modernity, the leftist film movement 
leaves enough room for the CCP to modify and re-narrate it in its own ideology after 1949.  
Actually, the 1930s Leftist Film Movement was reduced in the process of the CCP’s second 
canonization from the perspectives of film list, textual richness and cultural complexity. It 
may be a reason why scholars always face contradictions when they study this movement 
based on the CCP’s film lists and interpretations. 
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I. Introduction 
In his later years, the influential Chinese film historian Li Shaobai called for using the 
term “New Cultural Movement in Cinema” (dianying xinwenhua yundong電影新文化運動) 
to rename the Chinese film phenomenon of the 1930s to avoid overemphasis of an 
ideological approach. His plea seemed to contradict his earlier views that were represented in 
the influential book, The History of The Development of Chinese Film, widely considered the 
official textbook on Chinese film in Mainland China. In this book, he and his colleagues 
argued that some of the 1930s’ Chinese films should be categorized as part of a leftist1 
movement led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with the mission of resisting 
feudalism, imperialism, and the Kuomintang (KMT). Li’s strong statement reveals the 
contesting discourses hiding behind this historical event, and it prompted scholars to reflect 
on its complexity and actual meaning.     
From 1932 to 1937, China’s relationship with other countries was quite complex. In the 
field of film, it was a period of stiff competition with foreign powers in the local market and 
subsequently a golden time for Chinese film production. In the name of supporting national 
film, Chinese intellectuals launched various types of film practices. Being the ruling party of 
New China, the CCP selected films which were produced in the 1930s, and showed class 
struggle and the “accurate” ideology of the CCP as a group and canonized it as the Chinese 
                                                
1 Here the term “leftist” is different from the international definition, although it also refers to 
Communism and Socialism, since in a Chinese context, this “leftist” and “rightest” are very different from the 
original French “leftist.” In addition, in different periods Chinese history, the meaning and reference of the two 
terms has changed. Some scholars even point out that the Chinese leftist should be seen as to the Western 
rightist. That debate is beyond the scope of this essay.  
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Leftist Film Movement (Zhongguo zuoyi dianying yundong中國左翼電影運動)2 In order to 
legitimize the CCP’s authority, the leftist film movement was politicalized according to the 
CCP’s ideology and ideology became the primary method by which to study film in China.  
However, there are many debates and disagreements between scholars regarding this 
movement and its influence, since it had so many ambiguous aspects that cannot be 
explained from an ideological standpoint. The challenges of an ideological approach drove 
many scholars to look for new perspectives to study it. In her book, Building a New China in 
Cinema: The Chinese Left-Wing Cinema Movement, 1932–1937, Laikwan Pang views the 
left-wing film movement as a “national product”3 and examines it from the perspective of the 
construction of nationalism. Jubin Hu shares the same perspective. He indicates that during 
the 1930s, the realm of film was used as a battlefield for contending political agendas 
between the CCP and the KMT. The leftist film movement is a “cultural reflection of 
political and military conflicts between the KMT and the CCP.”4 There is no doubt that the 
KMT and the CCP’s nationalisms were different. But this difference cannot explain why 
were some films5 not only appreciated by the KMT as the representative films of China 
under its control, but also canonized as masterpieces promoted by the CCP?  
                                                
2 Cheng Jihua, Li Shaobai, and Wu Zuguang, The History of Development of Chinese Film (Zhongguo 
dianying fazhan shi中國電影發展史), Beijing: Chinese Film Press, 1963, 177. 
 
3 Laikwan Pang, Building a New China in Cinema: The Chinese Left-wing Cinema Movement, 1932–1937, 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 9. 
 
4 Jubin Hu, Projecting A Nation: Chinese National Cinema Before 1949, (HK: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2003), 77.  
 
5 For instance, the film Song of the Fisherman (Yuguang qu漁光曲, dir. Cai Chusheng, 1934) 
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Paul Pickowicz turns to the conflict between the West and China. He appropriates the 
Chinese political leader Deng Xiaoping’s statement of avoiding “spiritual pollution”6 to 
describe the leftist film productions in the 1930s. He points out that leftist films treated 
Western and bourgeois cultures as the main reason for China’s moral corruption. But when 
he highlights the conflict between the West and China, another interesting question rises to 
the surface: in what ways did the concept of the nation-state transform among certain groups 
of Chinese intellectuals during the 1930s? Actually, this question is very important, since it 
may help to avoid falling into the CCP’s ideological trap. The ambiguous concept of the 
nation-state China has been appropriated by the CCP to construct the illusion of historical 
continuity between the past and the present. Accordingly, if one does not distinguish the 
differences and functions of the concepts China in the past and present, one may easily be 
puzzled by the CCP’s post-1949 discourse, when his or her research refers to nationalism, 
modernity and so on. 
Victor Fan offers a different view from this consensus that the 1930s leftist film 
movement represented the CCP’s discourse. Fan analyzes two of Sun Yu’s films and claims, 
“The leftist film could be interpreted as an attempt to create a voice within the KMT-
dominated cultural discourse.”7 Although Fan’s claim is bold, his analysis relies only on two 
films directed by a single leftist filmmaker, which were produced by Lianhua, a film studio 
that had a close relationship with the KMT. Furthermore, although Sun Yu and Lianhua were 
significant in this movement, one need more evidence to prove that they were influential 
enough to represent the integration of this movement.  
                                                
6 Paul Pickowicz, China on Film: A Century of Exploration, Confrontation, and Controversy, (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 44. 
 
7 Victor Fan, “The Cinema of Sun Yu: Ice Cream For they Eye…But With a Homo Sacer,” Journal of 
Chinese Cinema, No.3, 5(2011): 22. 
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Leo Ou-fan Lee appropriates Jurgen Habermas’s theory about “public sphere.” Lee 
focuses on the “urban modernity”8 in Shanghai and the relationship between literature and 
film. He claims, “The leftist scriptwriters managed to tap into the anxieties of the Chinese 
audience not by injecting any blatant political ideology into their screenplays (censorship 
made this impossible) but by employing a new narrative mode.”9 However, Habermas’s 
public sphere has a limitation: it relies on a bourgeois society. In order to make Habermas’s 
theory effective for the Shanghai case, Lee’s statement also mainly relates to those Chinese 
urban intellectuals, like Liu Na’ou and Huang Jiamo, who might have a bourgeois or quasi-
bourgeois backgrounds. Although Habermas’s description of the characteristics of “public 
sphere,” which underscores negotiation and discussion about national project among 
intellectuals, in some sense, is similar to Shanghai’s social background in the 1930s. This 
public sphere model can hardly comprehend all the participants in the leftist film movement. 
In addition, in this book Lee does not concretely analyze the significant phenomenon for this 
film movement that the leftist film movement was full of contradictions and ambiguities.  
Although these scholars discuss the 1930s leftist film movement from various 
perspectives—nationalism, the conflict between China and the West, and Western 
modernism, most of them linger on an ideological dualism: the KMP/the CCP; West/China; 
Bourgeois/Proletariat. They seemingly treat the 1930s leftist film movement as a persistent 
conflict in every aspect without paying attention to the fact that the attitudes and opinions of 
the intellectuals shown in films were dynamic and sometimes compatible. For instance, as I 
mention previously, the KMT and the CCP could praise and accept the same films as 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
8 Leo Ou-fan Lee, Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930–1945, 
(Harvard University Press, 1999), 63. 
 
9 Ibid.,102.  
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representatives of their discourses. The leftists, in some sense, could tolerate others’ 
discourses, like urbanization and industrialization, which were from the West. In this sense, 
the boundary between the leftist and non-leftists films defined by the CCP is ambiguous. 
Conflict was not the whole picture of the 1930s. Besides conflict, tolerance, assimilation and 
mutual influence also existed.  
Facing these puzzling contradictions, Zhiwei Xiao calls into question the existence of the 
leftist film movement in his Chinese article, “The Mythology of The 1930s’ Leftist Film,” 
after he scrutinizes film censorship during the Republican period. Considering that many so-
called leftist films were praised by the KMT, Xiao concludes, “Even if the leftist film existed, 
it was not irreconcilable with the KMT’s policies.”10 Xiao’s question about the existence of 
the leftist film movement in some sense reveals that he turns to emphasize the aspect of 
ambiguities rather than the contradictions.  
Xiao’s question is effective if one asks: did the CCP’s leftist film movement exist in the 
1930s? His question also reminds that there are two concepts one needs to distinguish when 
he or she studies the leftist film movement: the CCP’s leftist film movement; a particular 
group of film practice in the 1930s, which in some sense subtly overlapped with the CCP’s 
one. For the studies of the previous scholars, including Xiao, the two concepts are to some 
degree intertwined. For instance, they always rely on the CCP’s list of leftist films and query 
the accuracy of the list. However, the CCP’s list, which was artificially defined after 1949, is 
not so reliable to restore the real history of the leftist film movement. In this thesis, I focus on 
the particular historical film practice, instead of the artificial one defined by the CCP. 
Although those scholars fail to distinguish the two subtle and deceptive concepts, their 
                                                                                                                                                  
  
10 Zhiwei Xiao, “The Mythology of The 1930s’ Leftist Film,” (Sanshi niandai zuoyi dianying shenhua三
十年代左翼電影神話), Hong Kong 21 Century, No. 103 (2007): 42.  
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observation of the 1930s leftist film movement is correct: it did co-exist with numerous 
ambiguities and conflicts. Accordingly, for the sake of analyzing the leftist film movement, 
one needs to find an alternative way to explain both the contradictions and ambiguities. 
In the 1930s, “modernity” was indeed an attractive topic for Chinese intellectuals. In his 
national project the New Life Movement (Xinshenghuo yundong新生活運動), the political 
leader of the KMT Chiang Kai-Shek called out to ordinary people to learn from “modern 
countries”11 in order to make China become modern.12 Ordinary filmmakers also paid 
attention to the importance of modernization of Chinese films. For instance, in his essay “A 
Brief History of Modern Chinese Film,” Zheng Junli underscores the significant mission of 
Chinese filmmakers in the 1930s was to improve “the economic and cultural standards of 
Chinese film…to the degree of modernization.”13 In this sense, the attempt of the 1930s 
Chinese film practice (no longer the leftist film movement but the whole 1930s film practice) 
had a close and subtle relationship with modernity. 
However, the definition of modernity is still in question. The modernity that scholars, 
like Lee, generally employ, actually, is Western modernity. In his book The Crisis of Global 
Modernity: Asian Traditions and A Sustainable Future, Prasenjit Duara has observed the 
negative influence of Western modernity on various aspects of society. He indicates “the 
model of modernity and modernization based on conquest of nature and driven by increasing 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
11 Chiang Kai-Shek, “The Essentials of New Life Movement,” (Xin shenghuo yundong zhi yaoyi新生活
運動之要義), Education Weekly (Jiaoyu zhoukan教育週刊), No. 8, 9(1934): 16. 
 
12 Chiang’s so-called modern was different from the general understanding. On the contrary, it inclined to 
traditional Confucianism. But his behavior of appropriating this term still demonstrated that modernity was an 
important topic in the 1930s. 
 
13 Zheng Junli, “A Brief History of Modern Chinese Film,” (Zhongguo dianying shilue中國電影史略), in 
China Film Archive edit, Chinese Silent Film (Zhongguo wusheng dianying中國無聲電影), (Beijing: Chinese 
Film Press, 1996), 1432. 
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production is no longer sustainable.”14 Duara also points out that Westernized modernity is 
just one type of modernity. In his book, Globalization and Culture, John Tomlinson defines 
the term modernity as a category that “refers at the same time to a particular type of social 
formation, to a form of cultural imagination, and to notions of novelty, contemporaneity, the 
present the ‘up-to-date’.”15 In addition, deviating from discourse on Orientalism to discuss 
modernity as a typical Western cultural phenomenon, Tomlinson suggests using the term 
“global modernity”16 to highlight “the different, multiple forms of modernity that presently 
exist.”17 Accordingly, Tomlinson’s broader concept of global modernity leaves room for us 
to study the 1930s Chinese leftist film movement. 
In order to replace Westernized modernity, Duara turns to the Asian tradition. Based on 
his study of the characteristics and functions of the Asian tradition, Duara defines several 
important concepts. According to Duara, dialogical transcendence is a category, which 
highlights exchange, coexistence and absorption of various discourses.18 Confucianism 
belongs to it. Circulatory history, which can go beyond the limitation of boundaries, can 
contribute to reduce confrontation and connect the self with others. Culture can generate 
powerful moral authority, which will encourage ordinary people to sacrifice for the 
community, and therefore it has a significant function on the achievement of dialogical 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
14 Prasenjit Duara, The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Traditions and A Sustainable Future 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 279. 
 
15 John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, (University of Chicago Press, 1999), 34. 
 
16 Ibid., 66. 
 
17 Ibid., 65. 
 
18 Duara, The Crisis of Global Modernity, 154-155. 
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transcendence. Duara concludes that only by holding a circulatory worldview and dialogical 
transcendence can humans find a way to work together to deal with crisis. 
Duara’s theory, actually, deals with a topic about how various, even opposite discourses 
can coexist peacefully and how their coexistence can contribute to the resolution of social 
crisis. Therefore, his model may be helpful for us to study the reason of the existence of 
ambiguities in the 1930s Chinese film field and its significance. In part II, I will appropriate 
Duara’s theory to outline the overall background of the 1930s Chinese film field and explain 
the process of formation of a pubic space19 in film field. I need to clarify that although 
Duara’s theory can be employed to explain the leftist film movement, it does not mean that 
his theory and terms guide the 1930s Chinese intellectuals.    
Following the May Fourth Movement, which appealed to completely Westernized China, 
in the 1930s, Chinese intellectuals turned to reflect on social crisis and tried to find a way to 
sustainably develop. Driving by the different backgrounds, the participants of 1930s’ film 
practice held various transcendences and diverse imaginations of the Chinese nation-state. 
Some of the transcendences showed a radical tendency, which enforced a single truth on 
masses and paid more attention to purification and exclusion. However, relying on the power 
of culture and the shared circulatory history of the community, many discussions about the 
topic of survival of the community helped to transform participants’ various transcendences 
into a dialogical degree, which in turn supported wider social discussions. In this way, a 
public space generated and developed in the field of film. The pubic space, conversely, 
strengthened and helped to expand social negotiation. Accordingly, filmmakers’ practice and 
thoughts showed assimilation and mutual influence from various discourses. 
                                                
19 In fact, this public space shares the similar characteristics of Habermas’s public sphere. However, in 
order to go beyond the political limitation of Habermas’s term and avoid falling into the debate about whether 
China had such a class in the 1930s, I will use public space to replace Habermas’s controversial term. 
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Being a branch of the whole 1930s film practice, leftist films also shared the similar 
characteristic to tolerate alien discourse to some degree. However, it does not mean that the 
leftist film movement had no difference with others. In part III, I will turn to the aspect of 
distinction and try to distinguish the leftist film movement by comparing it with soft films 
and films resonating with the KMT’s New Life Movement. The distinction of leftist films 
with non-leftist films lies in whether they expose social issues and whether they claim that 
remaining in a modern society but calling for transforming it to be a much healthier and 
suitable one for 1930s’ China. The two main principles made up the general framework of 
the leftist films. I continue to use the term leftist film movement to emphasize the inclination 
of the participants to progressiveness and social reform in the sense of modernity, instead of 
so-called ideological progressiveness. I argue that the behaviors of those Chinese 
intellectuals who participated in the leftist film movement should be seen as part of a 
dynamic process: they define Chinese form of modernity by comparing, selecting, absorbing, 
and rejecting cultural elements from both Chinese traditions and Western modernity. This 
new form of modernity did not have a set definition and was instead left open for discussion 
and negotiation. In addition to the active participants, some film texts were also selected as 
the components of this movement, since they could fit or mostly fit in its frame, although the 
directors and producers of those films did not intend on relying upon the principles of leftist 
films. In this sense, the leftist film movement of the 1930s was already part of a process of 
canonization.  
In part IV, I select two films—Yuan Muzhi’s Street Angel (Malu tianshi馬路天使 1937) 
and Sun Yu’s Big Road (Dalu大路, 1935)—representing the general stereotype of leftist 
films. For the first film, I analyze the cinematic strategy, which filmmakers employed to 
educate ordinary masses. First, the filmmakers intertwined the audience’s position with 
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films’ principals and created social allegories by constructing the male protagonists’ 
subjective points of view. Accordingly, principals, especially those male protagonists, 
become models to educate audiences on how to live in reality. By this strategy, the 
filmmakers led the audience to conclude that in the period of the 1930s people needed to 
choose and adjust to a Chinese type of modernity instead of going back to tradition. In my 
analysis of Sun’s film, I will center on the gender perspective to state that the variety of 
expressing forms and the diversity of discourses towards basic social issues in different leftist 
film texts based on the same framework. Sun’s film portrays how a girl with a degree of 
transcendence transforms from witness to participant. Unlike the female principal as object in 
Street Angel, the female lead in Sun’s film becomes the subject and model, which educates 
the masses on how to be a modern subject.  
In the conclusion, I trace the 1930s leftist film movement from a Longue Durée 
perspective to explain the reason why this movement becomes a controversial topic and its 
function in the CCP’s historical discourse. I propose to pay more attention to concepts of the 
Chinese nation-state in the 1930s and post-1949. In the 1930s, the concept of the Chinese 
nation-state was ambiguous because of its unique social background. The ambiguity of the 
concept in the 1930s helped the CCP substitute its national imagination for various other 
discourses imperceptibly after 1949. It means that after 1949, only the CCP can represent the 
Chinese nation-state, no matter referring to pre-1949 China or post-1949. The substitution is 
influential. First, in the name of the Chinese nation-state, only the films reflecting discourses 
which could support the legalization of the CCP’s authority were selected and canonized as 
Chinese film. Others were expelled in the name of being “non-Chinese” or “backward”. In 
this sense, not only the whole of 1930s film practice, but also the real leftist film movement 
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was reduced in CCP discourse. Accordingly, when one used the CCP’s lists to study the 
historical leftist film movement, he or she will face the same ideological trap. 
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II. Letting A Hundreds Flowers Bloom: The Background of The 1930s’ 
Chinese Film Practice 
A. Brief Introduction of the 1930s Chinese Film Production 
After the May Fourth Movement, which called for breaking down all the Chinese 
traditions and establishing a completely Westernized China, China rapidly pushed forward its 
projects of urbanization, industrialization, and modernization. Many Western-style 
metropolises like Shanghai were built on the mainland. Until the 1930s, the KMT had 
nominally unified China, and went into the comparatively flourishing age of the Nanjing 
Decade. But at the same time the early crisis of Western modernization became clear in 
1930s China, the shadow of war loomed darker and began to encapsulate China with the 
Japanese invasion. In cities, unemployment was increasing and social gaps became bigger. 
Accompanying the expansion of industrial capitalism, materialism and hedonism resulted in 
moral corruption. Wars driven by accumulating resources and benefits never stopped for a 
long period in China. At the same time, the pressure from the burgeoning need of 
productivity and material accumulation resulting from urbanization, the development of 
capitalism, and the continuous war situation, also influenced the countryside. Natural 
disasters and famines frequently happened. As writer Mao Dun indicated, “it has been a hard 
fact that the countryside was also on the edge of bankruptcy.”20  
Before the 1930s, Chinese film production moved ahead in its struggle to compete with 
foreign films. There is no doubt that Chinese filmmakers absorbed a lot from foreign films in 
                                                
20 Mao Dun, “Torrent and Night in the City” (Kuangliu yu chengshi zhiye《狂流》與《城市之夜》), 
first published in Shenbao (申報), 1933, in Chinese Leftist Film Movement (Zhongguo zuoyi dianying yundong
中國左翼電影運動), Chinese Film Archive edit, (Beijing: Chinese Film Press, 1933), 413.  
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terms of narrative, cinematic language, and production, especially from Hollywood and the 
Soviet Montage School. But as time went on, seeking profit became the main drive for many 
Chinese filmmakers. In director Zheng Junli’s film historical analysis from 1926 to 1930, 
Chinese filmmakers created a Chinese genre: Marital Art Fantasy Films, but subsequently the 
film industry went into a period of decline, because of the general low quality.21 Turning to 
the 1930s, with the complex social background, according to film director Cheng Bugao, “the 
various strong voices give [Chinese people] a big simulation: reaction, change, looking for 
solutions, transforming thoughts, and social reforms. Film also changes.”22 During this 
period of the 1930s, Chinese intellectuals and filmmakers initiated a film practice including 
three significant branches—leftist film, soft film, and film resonating with the KMT’s New 
Life Movement. Film became a powerful stage to portray and discuss social problems.  
Sun Yu’s Big Road and Yuan Muzhi’s Street Angel describe the wide gulf between rich 
and poor in the city. Mingyou and Zhu Shilin’s cooperative film National Customs (Guofeng
國風, 1935) focuses on moral corruption in cities. Wu Yonggang’s Waves Washing the Sand 
(Langtaosha浪淘沙, 1936) tries to reflect on the contradiction between morality and law. 
Zhang Shichuan’s The Tenderness Market (Zhifen shichang脂粉市場, 1933) and Wu 
Yonggang’s The Goddess (Shennu神女, 1934) depict female issues in urban areas. Fei Mu’s 
A Sea of Fragrant Snow (Xiangxuehai香雪海, 1934) refers to warfare’s negative impact on 
the countryside and the contradictions between belief, superstition, and reality. In addition, 
real natural disasters also attracted filmmakers’ attention. Bu Wancang’s Conscienceless 
                                                
21 Zheng Junli, “A Brief History,” 1387. 
 
22 Cheng Bugao, “Torrent,” (Kuangliu狂流) originally published in Modern Film (Dangdai dianying當
代電影), No. 1(1933), in Chinese Silent Film (Zhongguo wusheng dianying中國無聲電影), China Film 
Archive edit, (Beijing: Chinese Film Press, 1996), 348. 
  
14 
(Rendao人道, 1932) relates to a catastrophic drought in the countryside. In his Torrent 
(Kuangliu狂流, 1933), Cheng Bugao not only takes the Yangtse River flood in the Jiangnan 
area as his subject but also directly appropriates the record of the image of real floods in his 
film. Another of Cheng’s films, Spring Silkworms (Chuncan春蠶, 1933), is inspired by news 
that the sericulture in the Northern Zhejiang has been harvested, but the sericulturists are 
bankrupt because of the pressure from capitalist powers. Therefore, as Zheng Junli observed, 
in the 1930s, Chinese film “became closer to social reality and fulfilled the needs of the 
era.”23 
B. Coexistence of Multiple Transcendences Among Chinese Intellectuals 
One of the outstanding characteristics of the 1930s film practice was the participants’ 
complex background from the perspectives of economy, politics, and culture.24 In the area of 
political background, some of them, like many filmmakers from the Lianhua film studio, had 
a sensitive relationship with the ruling KMT.25 There were participants from the CCP, like 
Xia Yan and Zheng Boqi. Some were pro-leftist (or future leftists), like Hong Shen and 
Zheng Junli. Some of them had no clear political tendency like Fei Mu. From the perspective 
of the economy, the film tycoons like Luo Mingyou belonged to the capitalist class. 
Proletarians like Cai Chusheng were also influential figures in this movement. From the 
angle of culture, the backgrounds of the participants became more complex. In the 1930s, 
globalization sped up communication among different cultures. Director Sun Yu and 
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intellectual Hong Shen were trained in American universities. The writer and filmmaker Liu 
Na’ou was culturally influenced by Japan and Europe. The famous filmmaker Fei Mu grew 
up in a family with a deep atmosphere of Confucianism. There is no doubt that Russian and 
Japanese Marxism significantly influenced those leftists like Xia Yan. Besides his status as a 
capitalist, the film tycoon Luo Mingyou believed in Christianity.26  
What is more interesting is the fact that the personal background did not draw clear lines 
among those intellectuals. On the contrary, they could work together in the same companies 
and studios. For instance, although Lianhua had a close relationship with the KMT, some 
pro-leftist filmmakers like Cai Chusheng still worked in it and produced many influential 
leftist films. In fact, although leftists were sensitive and dangerous figures in the political 
background of the 1930s, almost all of the big film companies in Shanghai, including Star, 
Lianhua, Tianyi and Yihua at some point recruited leftists to join their film production.27 
Moreover, a single individual might represent several identities. The director Fei Mu had a 
strong affinity for traditional culture. But his The Wolf Hill (Langshan diexue ji狼山喋血記, 
1936) was highly appreciated by leftists. Fei Mu was also categorized as leftist filmmaker in 
the CCP’s discourse, although most of his 1930s films had a close relationship with 
Confucianism and traditional values, which were blamed by leftists. Accordingly, it is very 
hard to separate and distinguish the 1930s Chinese intellectuals by their personal 
backgrounds, especially from the political perspective. Coexistence permeated almost every 
aspect of society. 
Those participants’ complex backgrounds in some sense revealed the fact that they held 
diverse transcendences. According to Duara, transcendence is not limited to religion, but a 
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“human yearning . . . beyond here and now of the word.”28 In this definition, ideologies, like 
Marxism, and nationalism, to some degree, may be transcendent. He also distinguishes two 
types of transcendence: radical and dialogical. Radical transcendence, like Abrahamic 
monotheism, is a type of transcendence in which people try to “distinguish themselves from 
others . . . [and their] contestation led to highly competitive and intolerant environment.”29 
As the example of Islam exposes, radical transcendence has a tendency to exclude others for 
the sake of what they see as the purity of their own group. On the contrary, dialogical 
transcendence is “one of exchange, competition, coexistence and partial absorption . . . [and] 
has remained relevant for many who seek guidance for moral transformation of self and 
society.”30 Unlike radical transcendence, dialogical transcendence underscores tolerant 
attitude towards others, coexistence of multi-truth, and negotiation among different opinions.  
Based on Duara’s definitions, among the participants of the 1930s film movement, there 
were at least three clear types of transcendence: Marxism, Confucianism, and Christianity, 
and these transcendences might have radical tendencies to some degree. The main reason 
motivating the CCP to accept the proposal that they would send three party members, Xia 
Yan, Qian Xingtun, and Zheng Boqi, to participate in film production was the benefit of 
absorbing more followers and apostates of other parties to join the CCP. Nonetheless, before 
the three party members went into the film field, the political leader Qu Qiubai reminded 
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them, “you must be especially careful.”31 Qu’s words made the three young leftists think for 
a long time. They believed that Qu tried to warn them to “work scrupulously and cautiously, 
insist on their position . . . [and to] avoid being contaminated by others’ bad behavior and 
habits.”32 His warning revealed that their transcendence (Chinese Marxism33), similar to 
radical transcendence, had a tendency to exclude others. Paul Pickowicz indicates that the 
1930s leftist film movement should be interpreted as an act of “avoiding spiritual 
pollution.”34 At least in the beginning period, Pickowicz is correct and this term clearly 
points out the exclusive characteristic of Chinese Marxism. During the Cultural Revolution, 
when this transcendence became completely subordinated to political power, its radical 
tendency to purge others went to an extreme degree.  
Moreover, although in Duara’s interpretation, traditional Confucianism can be seen as 
the representative of dialogical transcendence, the KMT’s political appropriation of 
Confucianism in some sense transformed it into an exclusive tendency in the New Life 
Movement. The political leader of the KMT, Chiang Kai-Shek, announced that the weakness 
of China was due to the country’s moral degeneracy. In order to save the nation-state, Chiang 
Kai-Shek argued that Chinese people should have “national morality.”35 Relying on 
traditional Confucian’s doctrines, Chiang defined “propriety, righteousness, honesty, and a 
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sense of shame”36 as the central themes of the national morality. In order to emphasize the 
importance and significance of Confucian morality, Chiang also compared it with Western 
disciplines and stated that “if we forget those moralities, and just teach [Chinese youths] 
Physics, Chemistry and English, although we can teach them very well, it is nothing 
meaningful, since even beasts can be taught to learn [those Western disciplines]. It is the 
morality that distinguishes human beings from beasts.”37 Through his words, Chiang indeed 
tried to transform the Chinese society back to a Confucian tradition. Moreover, this 
transformation explicitly belittled and excluded Western cultures. On the other hand, the 
KMT’s political coercion on every individual in order to prompt this project also revealed the 
influence from the West in the deeper structure of this movement, especially Fascism, which 
propagates a much more exclusive attitude towards others. Therefore, the dialogical 
transcendence in some sense was transformed by the political goal into a comparatively 
radical tendency and shared the similar hint of “avoiding spiritual pollution” with the CCP. 
There is no doubt that Pickowicz’ theory is suitable to describe the early stage of the 
1930s film practice. However, one cannot ignore the fact that as the development of this film 
practice, the radical tendency was seemingly transformed. Discourses from others became 
tolerable among different groups. Of course, one can find banned and censored films in the 
1930s. On the other hand, it cannot be refused that the KMT did not ban all the heterodox 
discourses. It is clear that films with various, even opposite discourses, like leftist films and 
soft films, coexisted and released in the similar period. It seems that the transcendences, 
which support people’s actions, were changed to be a dialogical degree. Therefore, one needs 
to find an answer to explain how and why the change occurred. 
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C. Approaching Dialogical Transcendence: The Formation of Public Space in Film 
Field 
According to Duara, transcendence can create moral authority, which can “serve as a 
historical motor to empower the quest for justice and its ideal of a better world.”38 And the 
better world will have “a new order that more truthfully represent[s] the transcendent 
ideas.”39 Therefore, this moral authority can be employed to motivate ordinary people to 
sacrifice themselves for it. Because of the relationship between transcendence and moral 
authority, the process of occupying and fixing particular moral authority symbolized the 
competition to gain legalized specific transcendence. The participants in the 1930s film 
movement also contended for the prominence of the moral authority matched with their 
transcendence by discussions and evaluations of lowercase cultures. The lowercase culture, 
in Duara’s interpretation, “refers to the meanings and significances which people give to 
events, practices, customs and institutions that enable everyday activity, interpersonal 
relationships, career and life courses, and the like.”40 In the film field, from the perspective of 
moral authority, filmmakers promoted a wide discussion with diverse topics relating to the 
lowercase culture, including Western/traditional education, extravagant/comfortable urban 
life, free love/arranged marriage, female virtues, and so on. 
In 1935, Fei Mu directed a film named A Song of China (Tianlun天輪). This film, as 
leftist critic Shi Linghe indicates, discusses a theme relating to traditional filial piety—
“expanding the respect of the aged in one’s family to that of other families; expanding the 
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love of the youth in one’s family to that of other families”--by portraying the change of four 
generations in a family.41 Filmmakers equate moral corruption with the urban world, and 
morality with countryside, by way of a comparison between the second and third generation. 
The second generation became the moral model, since they opened an orphanage in the 
countryside and tried to re-educate the third generation by leading them to live in a rural area. 
But the third generation who insists on living in the city is degenerate. Everyday they go out 
to gamble and lose themselves in parties. They are neither filial to their parents nor do they 
educate their children. Accordingly, the film explicitly highlights the moral authority of 
traditional Confucianism. 
In 1936, Cai Chusheng’s leftist film A Lamb Astray (Mitu de gaoyang迷途的羔羊) 
implied a tendency to try and underscore the moral power of the working class and blame 
capitalism as the origin of moral degeneration. In this film, the only character who gives real 
sympathy to the homeless children in the city is a poor servitor. Although the waifs in the 
film are poor, they are not moral, since they steal. Only by working can they become moral 
and therefore distinguish themselves with the rich but immoral capitalist. In this sense, 
working and working class occupy the moral authority.   
In the famous soft film Tomboy (Huashen guniang化身姑娘, dir. Fang Peilin, 1936), 
the filmmakers do not mention moral corruption, but highlight the comfortable urban life 
using a mismatched love triangle between three youths. The protagonists never try to reflect 
on their colonial living situation (in Qingdao and Singapore); on the contrary, they seem to 
view their living situation as a matter of course and are immersed in the comfortable spaces, 
where there are no poor people, no social issues, no darkness, and no conflicts; the only 
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trouble for youths is their personal love. In fact, by refusing to refer to moral discussion, this 
kind of film tried to treat materialism and capitalism as normal, even as moral.  
Duara also mentions “competition based on the belief in truth did not necessarily lead to 
large-scale elimination of the Other.”42 Although those film groups had different ideas about 
a particular social issue and tried to compete with each other to propagate and fix the moral 
authority of their transcendences among ordinary people, they still shared a consensus on a 
higher moral authority—saving the community, which kept their competition in a degree of 
negotiation instead of exclusivity and purification. Here, one needs to pay attention to the 
term community, instead of the Chinese nation-state, considering the complexity of nation-
states and nationalism in 1930s China. 
Actually, although almost all the participants cried for nationalism and national survival, 
“China” was an ambiguous entity that covered the coexistence of different types of 
nationalism and ideology. Only in Shanghai had the existence of foreign concessions already 
made the consciousness of nationalism complex for people who lived there. Besides, there 
were also some people from Taiwan and Hong Kong, like Liu Na’ou and Luo Mingyou,43 
who migrated to Shanghai to participate in 1930s film production. It is hard to simply declare 
that those people shared the same nationalism as other local people, considering their 
differences in education, training, and life experience in colonial areas. Moreover, filmmaker 
Li Minwei, who was born in Japan but was seen as the father of Hong Kong film, was also 
active in 1930s Shanghai film circles. When it comes to filmmakers like Li, issues of national 
identity become a complex issue that is not always easily boiled down to essentialist views. 
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At the same time after the Northern Expedition, the KMT in the late 1920s ended the rule by 
warlords and nominally controlled the mainland. The New Life Movement was a significant 
campaign to support and prompt the KMT’s nationalism. There is no doubt that the “China” 
the KMT tried to create was different from the CCP’s. For the CCP, although they were in 
danger of political purging, supported by Chinese Marxism and its comparatively mature 
institution and organization, they also propagated their own nationalism in their bases and 
secretly spread it in other areas. As the CCP member Xia Yan recorded, the political leader 
Qu Qiubai in the 1930s used the phrase: “obtained all under heaven (tianxia)”44 to refer to the 
CCP’s imagined future nation-state.  
Besides, the territories, which fix those nationalisms, were very ambiguous and dynamic 
too. Qu’s tianxia has a very ambiguous boundary and blurs the CCP’s concrete nationalism. 
It is difficult to know whether Qu’s tianxia included foreign concessions in Shanghai, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Manchuria, Mongolia, and so on. The same vagueness existed in other 
groups, too. If Qu’s tianxia implied that the CCP hoped to get back all those captured areas, 
the KMT’s tolerance of the coexistence of foreign powers, then, demonstrated that the 
KMT’s imaged national territory was different from the CCP. Meanwhile, for the Taiwanese, 
who grew up and were educated under colonial rule, did Liu Na’ou have the same 
imagination of the boundary and concept of “China” as local ordinary people and radical 
progressives? Therefore, although all the participants appropriated the term “China” and the 
idea of the nation-state, their individual types of nationalism were not necessarily fixed on 
the same territorial and national boundaries.  
But based on Duara’s statement that “the very purpose of nationalism remains to 
advance the national interests through the medium of the nation-state . . . nationalism is 
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potentially a form of absolutism,”45 it seems that in the 1930s, the different forms of 
nationalism should not have tolerated each other but needed to exclude others. However, the 
fact was on the contrary. Considering it, I argue that it is circulatory history that made a 
contribution to the coexistence of different kinds of nationalism. Based on the complexity 
and differences in the perspective of nationalism, the concept “China” was reduced from a 
nation-state to a community. What motivated and connected those participants to fight for the 
community was not a particular and concrete nationalism, but the “circulatory history”46 of 
their community, which highlighted “the ideas of common origin of a people typically 
derived from a common ancestor.”47  
According to Duara, the circulatory is not a one-way influence but a multi-process. In 
other words, the process does not finish by the delivery of the influence from a sender to a 
receiver. The receiver will absorb and modify the message and re-send the modified version 
back to the original sender. In some sense, the process can be seen as endlessly circular. 
During this infinite process, the boundary between self and other become ambiguous, since 
the multiple influences assimilates each other. Accordingly, the circulatory history can help 
to leave the hostility and conflict among rivals in abeyance, even though the line between self 
and other may be still there.  
This theory can be appropriated to explain the reason why Chinese intellectuals in some 
sense gave up their position of hostility in the 1930s. It is their shared circulatory history that 
weakened their hostility. Although they belonged to different groups and their identities with 
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various degrees of difference, the circulatory history, instead of the controversial nationalism 
and nation-state, closely connected them together and highlighted their similarities. In fact, 
the Japanese military’s propaganda about “the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” also 
appropriated circulatory history as a strategy in order to persuade the East Asian people to 
give up their refusal of Japanese colonization. The difference between Japanese strategy and 
the Chinese one was whether Japan or China was the leader of the circulatory history. For 
those Chinese intellectuals, there was no doubt that China was the leading role. Here, one can 
find that although the concept “China” was ambiguous among different groups and 
individuals, it still had a relatively stable content, facing another country or an absolute 
enemy--Japan. The moral authority of saving the community where all the participants 
shared a circulatory history guided the participants to move beyond the obstacles of limited 
nationalism and so-called national interests and to tolerate each other. Finally, they 
approached dialogical transcendence, which, according to Duara’s summary, highlights the 
characteristics of “exchange, competition, coexistence and partial absorption.”48    
The flourishing publishing industry of the 1930s also offered a comparatively equal and 
peaceful platform for discussion and negotiation. The debate between soft and hard (leftist) 
film is a typical example. There is no doubt that the leftists who supported Chinese Marxism 
had the opposite transcendence of the proponents of soft film who encouraged people to 
enjoy their material lives. What they did to compete with each other was publishing film 
reviews and academic discussions in newspapers and magazines. From 1934 to 1935, relating 
to the topics of the nature of film, the future of Chinese film, and the function of film critics, 
the supplement of Chenbao (晨報)—Daily Film (Meiri dianying每日電影)—not only 
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published reviews and essays by leaders in the soft film camp, like Mu Shiying and Jiang 
Jianxia, but also published articles written by leftists like Chen Wu, Tang Na, and Lu Si. The 
platform of the printing press, similar to the film field, meant more and more people could 
equally and freely access the various attitudes toward social issues and deeper transcendence.  
Moreover, as film practice unfolded throughout the 1930s, the participants began to call 
for continuing and expanding the discussion by refusing to offer imagined solutions to the 
issues revealed in films. Most films included open endings to invite discourse, discussion, 
and negotiation. As the leftist leader Xi Naifang proposed in the 1930s, “the new suggestion 
is [producing] films without conclusions . . . exposing the contradictions and irrationalities of 
the reality in front of the eyes of the audience; letting them deeply understand the necessity 
of social reform; and guiding them to eagerly look for their own outlets.”49 Xi’s words 
explicitly indicate that even the group of leftists, who had a clear truth and belief in their 
imagination of human’s destiny, and was seriously fearful of spiritual pollution at the 
beginning, had now accepted giving up imposing their unique truth on the masses. The 
textual openness and consensus of refusal to give a resolution as the unique truth to the 
masses symbolizes the fact that dialogical transcendence50 had been achieved. It helped to 
transform the film field into a public space, in which not only intellectuals could discuss 
issues on equal terms with one another, but ordinary people could also access various 
discourses legally. Conversely, the public space made contributions to help the participants’ 
transcendence move much closer to a dialogical space. 
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III.  At the Crossroads: Turn Left or Right? 
A. Difficulties to Define the Leftist Film Movement 
In the perspective of his theory of “spiritual pollution,” Pickowicz emphasizes that in 
leftist films, filmmakers constructed “a simple dichotomy of Chinese purity and Western 
moral degradation offer[ing] no middle ground.”51 The countryside represents tradition, 
innocence and harmony; on the contrary, the modern city like Shanghai is “corrupt, evil and 
un-Chinese…the symbol of an aggressive Western presence in China.”52 There was a 
discussion about whether or not China needed to be Westernized in the 1930s. Many people 
rejected it, like the proponents of the KMT’s national project. On the other hand, others 
showed a different attitude. Shi Dongshan, the leftist filmmaker, who was also a member of 
Chinese leftist writers camp, published an essay to discuss this issue. He indicated, “the 
offensive attitude [to believe] that Europeanization is always bad is not tolerant. It is also 
wrong in the aspect of ideology.”53 On the contrary, in order to be stronger, China should not 
be afraid of the positive assimilations. He proposed, “Now is Europeanization. In the future, 
it may be other kinds of assimilation. But if it is worth to assimilate, I am eager to be 
assimilated.”54 In this sense, intellectuals like Shi Dongshan did not completely refuse 
foreign influences. On the contrary, they praised and welcomed it.   
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The inclination to accept positive assimilations can be interpreted by the effect of 
dialogical transcendence. Being a branch of the 1930s film practice, the leftist film 
movement did share the similar characteristic to tolerate alien discourses and multi-truth. The 
public space in film field offered a change for the participants in the leftist film movement to 
exchange opinions with others. In this process, assimilations were accessible. Their films 
then became the main products to express the result of assimilations. Consequently, it is easy 
to find the coexistence of diverse voices in the leftist film movement.  
In most of Cai Chusheng’s works, the dance hall is a corrupt and decadent. People go 
there will also be polluted by its alien value. Unlike Cai’s portrayal, in Yuan Muzhi’s Street 
Angel, the dance hall is an attractive element that appeals to ordinary youths to go to explore 
it. There is a discrepancy of opinion about this symbolism of Western culture between the 
two filmmakers who are both canonized as great leftist filmmakers. In New Women, female 
worker, A Ying, is powerful and represents the hopeful new women. However, in 
Crossroads, female workers, like Ms. Yang, are weak and struggle under the exploitation of 
the factory bosses. In The Goddess, Western-style education is the final solution and hope of 
the poor mother. She sacrifices herself in order to exchange an opportunity for her son to 
attend a Western-style school. But in A Lamb Astray, as critic Jin Zeren indicated, it “exposes 
the corruption of the countryside education, at the same time, eposes the fail of the so-called 
modern education.”55 Instead, only work can guide them to go to the right way.   
The flexible and paradoxical characteristic of the leftist film movement also partly 
resulted in the difficulties for scholars to find a fixed criterion to distinguish this film branch 
from others. Moreover, similar to other groups of film practice in the 1930s, leftist film group 
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was also composed of participants with complex and intertwined backgrounds. In this 
situation, how can we clarify the distinctiveness of this movement? I suggest to go back to 
textual studies: analyzing film texts and film reviews to look for and summarize similarities 
shared and acknowledged by most participants. It is undeniable that social background and 
international relations in the 1930s were very sensitive and bewildering. Although 
intellectuals could have chances to take part in public discussion, it does not mean that they 
were completely free. Instead, censorship was still strict. As director Shen Xiling mentioned, 
in 1930s’ Shanghai, “we [i.e., intellectuals] cannot say a sentence like getting back the lost 
territories; we cannot hang on a map of Northeastern China…”56 The sensitive surroundings 
and strict censorship restricted intellectuals’ writings and film products. In order to escape 
from the coercive confines, texts including film texts and film reviews in the 1930s were 
filled with argot, metaphors, symbols and allegories. As director Sun Yu indicated in his 
interpretation of the film Big Road, “when audiences watch my film Big Road, [they will find 
that] many portrayals and subtitles in this film are obscure and difficult. We should feel sorry 
for it, but it derives from the need of the surroundings.”57 Considering the ambiguities of 
leftist film texts, paying attention to and deciphering connotations of details in those texts 
becomes a significant process. 
B. Characteristics of the Leftist Film Movement: Two Core Principles 
As I mention in Chapter 2, modernity is a prevalent topic among Chinese intellectuals in 
the 1930s, even Chiang’s national project was launched in the name of creating a modern 
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nation-state. Closely relating to this topic, a dominant content in most 1930s’ films was the 
contradiction between the city where in general is portrayed as a symbol of modernity, and 
the countryside where represents tradition because of the relative lack of influence from 
Western culture. For participants in the leftist film movement, they could never be satisfied 
with the Western modernity of the city, or the feudal traditions in the countryside. Resonating 
to the slogan “exposing the darkness of the society”58 in almost all the leftist reviews, the 
contents of leftist film texts likewise refer to social issues in either urban or rural areas. But 
simultaneously, as the accessible and legalized references, when they discussed social issues 
and possible solutions, they could not completely give up either of the two. Instead, their 
attitude towards the possible solutions always relied on their evaluations of the two 
references. They appealed to ordinary people to accept positive assimilations instead of 
“remaining any expectations for the old society [i.e., traditional society].”59 On the other 
hand, as Shi Dongshan indicated, it does not mean that they should destroy all the old 
traditions,60 while “imitating the bad aspect of foreigners should be attacked.”61 In this sense, 
intellectuals like Shi in the 1930s was looking for an alternative modernity, based on their 
evaluations of the benefits and harms of their familiar cultural elements from both Western 
modernity and tradition.  
In fact, from the angle of film texts, facing the choice between the city and the 
countryside, leftist films also generally persuade people to stay in the modern city and 
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transform it without urging people to return to the countryside, where modernity has no 
influence. By examining films separately representing soft films, the films resonating with 
the KMT’s New Life Movement, and the leftist films, the distinctiveness of leftist films will 
be much clearer. The term “modern” was also pervasive in the essays written by the 
proponents of soft film. According to Huang Jiamo, who was one of the main activists in soft 
film camp, “we [i.e., filmmakers] should remember to ask ourselves whether all the themes 
we want to produce and all the methods we will use in films will fit in modern people’ 
taste.”62 He announced that instead of directly reencountering the dark and serious society in 
the theater, by watching films, modern audiences expect to be “liberated from the boring 
ordinary life.”63 Film, in Huang’s definition, “is the ice cream for eyes, and sofa for souls.”64 
Accordingly, soft filmmakers focused on all the topics, which could produce visual pleasure, 
like female bodies, love and suspense. As my introduction of Fang Peilin’s Tomboy in 
Chapter 2, this typical soft film attracts audience’s eyes by a topic about an ambiguous 
homosexual or heterosexual love. It never refers to the darkness of the society, although the 
cinematic space in which the story occurs offers a natural chance to portray and discuss 
social issues. Besides Tomboy, almost all soft films, like Map of Treasures (Baibao tu百寶
圖, dir. Yue Feng, 1936), Murder in the Wedding (Xinhun da xue’an新婚大血案, dir. Wang 
Cilong, 1936), and A Mystical Flower (Shenmi zhihua神秘之花, dir. Yue Feng, 1937), insist 
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on exploring film’s ability to evoke and expand sensual pleasure.65 Some film critics blamed 
Fang’s Tomboy, and indicated that this film “intently make[s] the audience forget the reality 
that the nation is suffering the enemy’s invasion and massacre and national heroes are 
fighting for the survival of the nation. It persuades people to stay in a nonsense story in 
which woman transforms into man and man transforms into woman.”66 Although this review 
was aggressive, it demonstrated that the main purpose of soft films were not to expose social 
issues but to encourage the masses to be attracted to the multiple pleasures deriving from 
modern life.               
In order to propagate the KMT’s national project the New Life Movement, the KMT 
supported Lianhua to produce several films, which could be seen as the KMT’s national 
films in the 1930s. Resonating with the KMT’s discourse, in 1935, Zhu Shilin and Luo 
Mingyou cooperated on a film titled National Customs. By portraying two sisters’ lives as 
students in a modern city, filmmakers shared their critiques towards cities’ moral corruption 
while also depicting their appreciation of the beauty and simplicity of the countryside, which 
was portrayed as typically traditional from the perspectives of both the decoration of the 
buildings and people’s values (Figure 1). In this film, though both the sisters get the same 
Western education, their lifestyle choices are quite different. The elder sister supports 
traditional morality and thus keeps her innocence and honesty, though she is surrounded by 
factors of the city that induce people to be corrupt. However, her young sister is inclined to 
follow the Western-style modern life and thus degenerates under the temptation of the 
extravagance of the city. In this sense, the filmmakers try to align the film with Chiang’s 
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political doctrine that Western education cannot save the country if people, like the young 
sister, do not have Chiang’s national morality. 
                    
                 Figure 1. Traditional decoration of the buildings in the countryside 
In addition, through the portrayal and the lines of the elder sister, filmmakers repeat the 
information that people should avoid spiritual pollution from Western cultures, like 
materialism, being busy with social activities and so-called free love. This film explicitly 
conveys the viewpoint that people should return to the countryside (or traditional society) to 
improve their morality, since the young sister and her lover are suddenly transformed to be 
eager to contribute to the nation after they live in the village for a period of time. Based on 
those plots, filmmakers make a simple dichotomy in order to exclude Western culture and 
absolutely applaud Chinese tradition. In this sense, this film’s narrative strategy is in 
accordance with Pickowize’s theory. Therefore, Pickowize’s theory cannot effectively 
distinguish leftist films from the KMT’s national films. 
In fact, most leftist films try to propose that rather than returning to traditional society, 
staying in modern city and transform it into much more healthy society may be the best 
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solution. Shen Xiling’s Crossroads (Shizi jietou十字街頭, 1937) explicitly shows that 
intellectuals in the leftist film movement were in favor of moving forward to a better type of 
modernity. Although the young people get a good Western-style education, they face 
unemployment and poverty again and again in the city. The female lead, Ms. Yang loses her 
job and must return to her rural home. The male protagonist Mr. Zhao, who loves her, feels 
worried about her decision and persuades her to stay in the city. His several cries “do not go 
back” reveal his anxiety about leaving the modern city and can be seen as a metaphor, which 
implies the rural area—the symbol of tradition—in some sense has been a nightmare for the 
youth, since going to the village means losing their love, job, and hope. Therefore, his love to 
Yang can hardly drive him to follow her to leave the city and go to the village. In fact, even 
though all of the youths in the film encounter many adversities, the modern city is still an 
attractive place for them. All of them return to the modern city, fueled by the beliefs that as 
long as they do not lose hearts and insist on doing something meaningful, they will finally 
find a way to survive in the city.  
Even though the youths favor to the modernization in the city, they do not satisfy with 
the whole situations here. On the contrary, the film mainly attacks the darkness in the city. 
According to the titles of the newspapers in the close-up, factory, which is a symbol of 
Western modernity, has become a “world without sun”  (Figure 2).  The big English words 
on the brand of Yang’s factory connect this space with Western modernity. In this space, a 
scoundrel flirts with Yang. Unlike other characters, the scoundrel wears a traditional long 
gown, and therefore can be seen as a symbol of feudal power.  In the same space, Yang loses 
her job, forcing her to be separated from her love. Accordingly, the respective symbolic 
meanings of the space and characters intertwine with each other and create a subtle 
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connection between Western modernity, feudal tradition, and serious social issues: it is 
Western modernity and feudal tradition that result in and sharpen the social issues.      
                             
                              Figure 2. Title of the newspaper: a world without sun 
Filmmakers need to offer or hint possible solutions, which may be beneficial to clinch 
those issues. Obviously, neither Western modernity nor feudal tradition can be the best 
choice. At the end of the film, filmmakers quote Yang to ask their question—where should 
we go? In fact, the answers given by Yang’s sister and Xiao Tang offer clues about the 
possible solution in the filmmakers’ imagination. Yang’s sister encourages the youth to “go 
forward!” If it is a metaphorical sentence, the word “forward” undoubtedly implies 
“modern,” which generally in the 1930s meant progressiveness. Xiao Tang indicates that 
they should learn from Gao Ge, who goes to the Northern China and leaves a message saying 
that he will do something meaningful. Since Gao Ge’s message is ambiguous, it is hard to 
assure that his so-called meaningful thing refers to Chinese Marxism or the CCP. 
Nonetheless, at any rate, through this film, one can get the clear information that the 
filmmakers employ metaphors to encourage ordinary people to stay in the modern city and 
do something to make it better. In other words, those intellectuals tried to find an alternative 
road for China, and this road could help China stay in the direction towards a suitable 
“modern.” In this sense, those intellectuals were actually looking for an alternative modernity. 
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Moreover, the meaning of the word “alternative” left room for the CCP’s discourse, since the 
CCP’s Marxism also might be seen as a third road besides tradition and Western modernity 
in the 1930s.   
The ambiguous description of the possible solutions demonstrated that the participants 
just drew a framework instead of a strict definition for the leftist films, based on a 
comparative consensus through discussion and negotiation from the perspective of China’s 
future road. The framework mainly included two aspects: exposing social darkness and 
looking for an alternative modernity. In this framework, the public space worked very well to 
tolerate diverse discourses in a certain degree. Although intellectuals looked for an 
alternative modernity, they could hardly jump out of the two most familiar paradigms—
Western modernity and tradition, which in the 1930s’ background were the safely and 
legitimately accessible references for Chinese intellectuals to publicly discuss. Instead, their 
definition about the alternative road mostly relied on their dynamic and flexible judgments 
and evaluations of elements from Western modernity and traditions.  
As film Crossroads shows, the apathy and materialism in Western modernity were bad 
and should be abandoned. But urbanization and industrialization, as building road in Big 
Road, were good and should be promoted. Being the representative of tradition, rural area 
was beautiful and peaceful. Personal relationship and humanity here were friendly and 
harmonious. In Crossroads, Yang’s sister, who lives in the village, is helpful and active. But 
the feudal and outdated power structure and values in the traditional villages should be 
rejected. In New Women, Wei Ming tries her best to flee from her traditionally patriarchal 
family to the modern city—Shanghai—where she can be free and independent. In Street 
Angel, the male protagonists try their best to help Xiao Hong escape the control of her feudal 
father.  
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Although filmmakers did not directly and comprehensively indicate what the alternative 
road was, by the portrayal of positive protagonists, who generally represent the filmmakers’ 
ideal, they hinted it as a mix of beneficial elements from both the Western and Chinese 
cultures. In Street Angel, after Xiao Hong escapes from the control of her adoptive parents, 
the male protagonists help her change her hairstyle from a traditional Chinese braid to 
modern short curly hair, which can be seen as a metaphor for modernization. But Xiao Hong 
still wears her traditional cheongsam. The transformation of Xiao Hong’s dress and make-up 
combining Chinese and Western styles serves as a metaphor to imply that China should 
change its road from tradition to an alternative modernity combining both Chinese and 
Western cultures. Other leftist films depict a similar phenomenon. In Big Road, being a 
beautiful and friendly countryside girl, Dingxiang waves her hair in a Western style by 
herself. In Wild Rose (Ye meigui野玫瑰, 1932), although she is from the countryside, Xiao 
Feng always wears curly hair from the beginning to the end. In Plunder of Peach and Plum 
(Taoli jie桃李劫, dir. Ying Yunwei, 1934), the character, who truly attempts to help the 
male protagonist Tao Jianping, is an old teacher. Unlike those negative characters who are 
either in complete western style or in traditional style, the old gentlemen is in a mixed 
style—wearing traditional long beard in a Western suits (Figure 3). 
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                     Figure 3. The appearance of Tao’s teacher 
C. Roles of Participants: Filmmakers/Critics; Active/Passive 
I need to highlight the complex constitution of the participants in the leftist film 
movement. Although it was a film movement, participants were not confined to the film field. 
Many intellectuals in printing press field were also involved in and functioned as significant 
roles. In other words, the leftist film movement not only included film production, but also 
embraced film reviews. In fact, film reviews, which might help the audience to easily 
understand the contents of films, became more and more important in the 1930s’ leftist film 
movement, because leftist film texts were quite ambiguous deriving from the pervasive 
metaphors, symbols, and allegories. Meanwhile, the ambiguity of film texts made various 
interpretations acceptable, and left room for propaganda. Intellectuals could easily guide the 
readers’ thoughts through writing reviews in a particular direction. In this sense, the printing 
press became a strategic area essential for contending.  
The leftist film movement got important support from many film magazines and 
newspapers. According to Xia Yan, “from 1932 to 1937… the supplement of Shibao (時
報)—Film Times (Dianying shibao電影時報), the supplement of Shenbao (申報)—Film 
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Special (Dianying zhuankan電影專刊), the supplement of Chenbao (晨報)---Daily Film 
(Meiri dianying每日電影) were completely controlled by us [i.e., leftists].”67 Those 
magazines and newspapers became the significant base for leftists, pro-leftists, and some 
ordinary intellectuals to discuss their imaginations about the future of China. During this 
process, they gradually got a comparatively flexible consensus about the criterion of their 
film practice: exposing social issues and finding an alternative modernity. Conversely, the 
consensus closely tied those participants together. Based on this criterion, they also selected 
particular films or some discourses in films as representative and guided filmmakers to work 
in the selected direction. 
There are many filmmakers, who consciously accepted this criterion, and relied on the 
leftist critics’ suggestions to modify their ideologies and film styles. Those people became 
active participants. For instance, after Cai Chusheng’s Pink Dream (Fenhongse de meng粉
紅色的夢, 1932) was released, leftist activist Nie Er published a review, which showed his 
disappointment to Cai, who, in Nie’s interpretation, was a hopeful youth, but produced an 
indecent film based on the stance of Capitalist morality.68 At the end of this article, Nie 
encouraged Cai to “give up his artistic dream… [and] go to the right direction as soon as 
possible.”69 In his 1936’s retrospection, Cai mentioned the negative criticisms about his Pink 
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Dream and “feels regretful to produce this film.”70 He agreed with Nie’s evaluation and 
states, “[filmmakers should be] an author who has the right ideology and works for the 
masses…I decide that my later films at least will portray the pains of those lower classes and 
be closer to the masses.”71 Cai’s announcement reveals that he had already accepted the 
guidance and influence of the participants in the leftist film movement. In this essay, Cai also 
promised, “I will try my best to repay your expectation.”72 Here, the personal pronoun “your” 
indirectly point to those participants in the leftist film movement, like Nie Er. Through his 
statement, Cai had already been transformed as an active participant.   
 However, not all intellectuals actively took part in this movement. There were also some 
filmmakers whose products just might occasionally match (or partly match) with the criterion 
of leftist films. After the occasional match, they might return to their ordinary orbit. In 1933, 
Fei Mu produced Night in the City (Chengshi zhiye城市之夜), which successfully exposes 
the darkness of the decadent city life. In this aspect, the film got positive comments from 
participants in the leftist film movement. But the end of the film that calls people to “go back 
to the rural area to create new life,” according to Mao Dun, should be seen as wrong, since in 
Mao’s analysis, Fei “takes the branch for the root, As a result, the exposure of the city 
darkness in the film becomes meaningless.”73 Mao’s rejection of the film’s ending suggests 
that he tried to guide Fei to the “accurate” leftist direction. However, Fei did not follow this 
suggestion. In the next few years, Fei produced several films, like his A Sea of Fragrant 
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Snow and Song of China. In those films, he highly praised Confucian belief, filial piety, 
traditional female values, and the harmony of traditional patriarchal families, which were 
closer to the KMT’s national morality. After watching Fei’s Life (Rensheng, 人生, 1934), Shi 
Linghe indicated that, “it is a more backward film than Night in the City.”74 But in 1936, 
Fei’s film The Wolf Hill, again, attracted leftists’ attention and got high appreciation from 
them. 
The changes that Fei’s career took was not a unique case. For director Wu Yonggang, his 
The Goddess, is canonized as leftist film, because it deeply exposes the social darkness: the 
sad situation of a single mother. In this film, the female protagonist has already gone out of 
the traditional family and until the end Wu never claims that she should give up her 
independence and go back to the patriarchal family, even though she is in struggle with pains. 
However, the director’s position in the angle of female issue seemingly changed after just 
one year. In his A Little Angel (Xiao tianshi小天使, 1935), the female character Mrs. Huang 
gives up her independence and goes back to the traditional family living together with her 
parents-in-law and children. Rather than praising the independence of the modern lady, Wu 
seemingly supported the return of women’s traditional values, like assisting husbands and 
education children, loyalty and filial piety. In his 1936’s film Waves Washing the Sand, the 
cinematic space moved from contemporary society to a desolate island, and Wu stepped 
away from social issues in order to discuss human nature. This film reflects on several 
contradictions: law/morality; personal desire/righteousness; friendship/hostility. According to 
leftist critic Shi Linghe, this film showed “an evasive attitude and just touch[ed] the 
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subordinate even unimportant social phenomena.”75 In Shi’s evaluation, although this film 
was better than the soft film Tomboy, which emphasized box office return, the focus of Wu’s 
film on art also could not be encouraged.76  
In order to explain Wu’ change, the CCP’s scholar Cheng Jihua in his historical book 
The Development History of Chinese Film explains that “Wu left the leftist film movement 
after producing his The Goddess in 1934 because of the stress from the KMT’s white 
terror.”77 However, according to Wu Yonggang, when he produced The Goddess, he neither 
dared to directly analyze or face the darkness of the prostitution issue, nor did he offer any 
solutions for the social issues he depicted in this film.78 He changed the theme of the film to 
“focus on maternal love. [The film is] transformed as a story about a prostitute who is 
struggling in a double life [i.e., being a mom and working as a prostitute] for her son.”79 
Wu’s words implied that he actually was not as brave as those leftists thought. Although his 
film could fit the criteria of a leftist film, he himself, tried to primarily emphasize the 
humanistic aspects of the film. He comprehensively explores and portrays a woman’s 
psychological contradictions as a single mom at the same time as a prostitute. This film also 
reveals the conflict between morality/law, which is shared in Waves Washing the Sand; and 
the selfless maternal love, which is depicted in A Little Angel. Accordingly, Wu never 
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changed his film style. On the contrary, as time went on, his style, which relates to the 
discussion about humanity and psychological contradictions, became much clearer.   
In this sense, unlike Cai Chusheng, Fei and Wu may not have been active participants in 
the leftist film movement, but some of their films do fit in the framework of leftist film 
production. This phenomenon might derive from the influence of the public space. The 
public space in cultural field offered and increased the possibility for filmmakers to touch 
and exchange different opinions. In this process, those inactive participants might have 
received some influence from leftist films. Therefore, the orbit of their style occasionally met 
with the leftist group. For those cases, it is hard to state that those filmmakers actually took 
part in the leftist film movement. Rather, their particular films were selected and canonized 
as leftist films. In this sense, what those active participants had done in the 1930s by writing 
film reviews and influencing film production was to canonize and create the leftist film 
movement. Their criteria when it came to canonization mainly relied on film text instead of 
filmmakers.  
Moreover, Wu’s The Goddess also indicates that some leftist film texts accept multiple 
interpretations from ideological and political aspects. Victor Fan indicates that for leftist 
films, “the forms and contents, the image and text all produced within an ideological 
framework.”80 But soft films were “open to multiple political interpretations.”81  There is no 
doubt that in many leftist reviews, leftist film texts were interpreted from the political 
perspective. Some leftists even tried to judge the backwardness and weak points of soft films, 
since the contents of those films cannot fit in their particular political aspect. But the 
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statements and announcements in leftist film reviews could not completely represent the 
original intentions of all the filmmakers. In other words, some leftist critics attempted to 
guide filmmakers to work in a particular political direction, but some filmmakers did not 
actively resonate with those critics, like Fei Mu and Wu Yonggang. That the content of those 
films could fit in ideological discourse mostly was fueled by leftist film reviews, which 
consciously guided interpretations to a particular direction. It is possible to interpret films 
like The Goddess from a perspective, which has no relation with ideological contradiction. 
Therefore, being a cultural phenomenon, many leftist film texts actually are open to multiple 
interpretations. 
D. Texts Open to Various Interpretations 
Although the effects of leftists in this movement were significant, it does not mean that 
the leftist film movement only represented the CCP’s discourse. First, in the 1930s, leftist 
was a dangerous label from political perspective. No one dared to publicly announce that 
they were leftist or believed in the CCP’s Marxism in film field. Even the leftists who 
directly took part in film production had to use pseudonyms in order to mask their political 
status. In this sense, the CCP’s political message conveyed by film texts would be relatively 
weak. Second, as Wu Yonggang’s The Goddess proves, the leftist film movement, as a 
cultural phenomenon, in some sense, accepts various interpretations. Third, narrative 
strategies like open-ended plots, and themes that exposed the darkness of society rather than 
offering solutions, resulted in many ambiguous texts, not only to help leftist films escape 
censorship, but also to leave room for multiple explanations. Forth, the attitude of peaceful 
negotiation and the existence of public space contribute to the fact that, to a certain degree, 
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the leftists gave up their exclusion. Therefore, the variety of discourse was tolerated in the 
leftist film movement.  
In fact, films in the 1930s, which could completely and perfectly represent the CCP’s 
discourse, were rare. Xia Yan, a leftist leader and the CCP member, wrote the screenplay for 
the film Torrent. Some intellectuals highly appreciated it, and considered it as an example 
that “displayed the progressive ideology,”82 and therefore could “represent the new road of 
Chinese film.”83 But other leftists were not completely satisfied with Xia’s work. Mao Dun 
praised this film, but he also pointed out that the ending of this film “[represents the 
statement that] heaven’s net has wide meshes, but nothing escapes it. [Therefore, it] has a 
feudal odor.”84 Leftist activist Xi Naifang also felt disappointed since the film did not 
comprehensively portray the masses activities and power.85 Even though a trustworthy and 
loyal leftist leader wrote the script, it still could not satisfy all the leftist and pro-leftist 
intellectuals. Therefore, although the leftist film movement has a subtle relationship with 
leftists and the CCP, they are not same. Nonetheless, the existence of the subtle relationship 
could be used by the CCP as a strategy to create its own historical discourse after 1949. 
The so-called leftist film movement is a product of multiple compromises and 
negotiations among different parties—leftists, pro-leftists, and ordinary filmmakers and 
intellectuals. Influenced by the public space, where various discourses were tolerant in 
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discussion and negotiation, participants of the leftist film movement achieved a consensus 
and drew a comparatively loose frame for their film production—exposing social darkness 
and finding an alternative modernity for China. Besides intentional productions, they also 
selected and canonized film texts, which could fit (or mostly) fit in their frame, as 
components of this movement. In this way, the leftist film camp became wider. 
Simultaneously, the leftists and the CCP had to give up their stance of exclusion to some 
degree. Accordingly, on the one hand, the leftist film movement indeed reflects some of the 
leftist imaginations of the future of China; On the other hand, it would not perfectly represent 
the ideology of a single political party. Instead, being a cultural movement, leftist film texts 
accepted different interpretations from multiple perspectives. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
  
46 
 
IV. Answering The Nation’s Call: Learning to Be A Modern Subject 
 
In this chapter, I try to use two typical leftist films to show how filmmakers used films to 
construct the dynamic concept of an alternative modernity; how they educated ordinary 
people to partake in this new modern lifestyle; and how they express various discourses in 
the same frame. For the first case, I will study Yuan Muzhi’s film Street Angel. It may 
represent the mature style of leftist films, in that it was produced in 1937 when the leftist film 
movement was winding down, and almost all scholars regard it as a leftist film. My analysis 
focuses on how the filmmakers used cinematic strategies to create social allegories for 
mobilizing and educating the audience to choose a particular life style—a suitable modernity 
for China. For the second case, I will study an earlier leftist film Big Road, which like Street 
Angel, also fits in the same frame: exposing social darkness and searching for an alternative 
modernity. But I will pay more attention to its differences, especially from the gender 
perspective, to explore the colorful expression of forms and various discourses among 
different leftist film texts behind the same two principles—exposing social darkness and 
looking for an alternative modernity.  
A. Case I: Street Angel 
In the 1930s, Chinese filmmakers were highly influenced by foreign films, especially 
Hollywood and Soviet films, from the perspectives of melodramatic narration, continuity 
editing and montage. In 1937, a young filmmaker Yuan Muzhi directed his second film 
Street Angel, which shares the same title with a popular American musical. Yuan’s film 
portrays the lives of several poor people living in the underground of a modern city. A 
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singing girl, Xiao Hong, and her sister Xiao Yun, who is forced into prostitution, make 
money for their adoptive parents. Xiao Hong falls in love with a trumpeter, Xiao Chen. 
However, her adoptive father tries to sell her to a local rogue, Lao Gu. In order to rescue 
Xiao Hong from this horrible life, Xiao Chen and his sworn brother Lao Wang hope to get 
help from a city lawyer, but because of poverty they fail. Inspired by the news, they persuade 
Xiao Hong to run away with them. With the help of Xiao Yun, Xiao Hong successfully 
escapes and marries Xiao Chen. But their adoptive father finally finds them. In order to save 
Xiao Hong, Xiao Yun sacrifices her life. Behind the simple love story, the film text is very 
rich. Many social issues are mentioned, like prostitution, the effectiveness of modern law, 
poverty, war, and other national crises. As a convention of leftist films, the filmmakers just 
use those issues to appeal to discussions among audiences instead of offering solutions for 
them. 
My analysis of this film focuses on three areas reflecting general stereotypes of leftist 
films. First, the filmmakers influence the audience’s position by constructing the 
protagonists’ subjective points of view. The active and lively images from male protagonists’ 
POV lure the audience to engage in the story and identify with those male protagonists. The 
lyrics of Xiao Hong’s songs, her personal experience, and her position as the object of male 
desire contribute to her objectification and help to transform her into the incarnation of China. 
Based on protagonists’ subject-object relationship, filmmakers create a social allegory, which 
mobilizes the audience to defend China. Then, through the protagonists’ efforts to be close to 
the modern city and the modernized transformation of Xiao Hong’s custom, filmmakers 
address that in a semi-modern and semi-traditional society, for the sake of solving the 
national crisis, China needs to choose its own type of modernity instead of going back to 
tradition or being completely Westernized. 
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1. Construction of the POV: Audience’s Identity and Female’s Function 
As Leo Ou-fan Lee mentions, in the 1930s, most of the leftist films paid attention to 
employ a “new narrative mode,”86 instead of direct ideological propaganda, although those 
film texts can be interpreted in ideological perspective. For the new narrative mode, some 
scholars have been inclined to conclude it was a Hollywood-influenced melodrama., In fact, 
to be more accurate, and considering the metaphoric functions of almost all protagonists in 
leftist films and the final purpose of this movement, I argue that this new narrative mode 
should be that of social allegory. In order to extend the effect of social allegory in reality, 
filmmakers used their protagonists to construct what, in Lacanian terms, might be called an 
“ideal self” to attract and encourage the audience to follow and imitate protagonists’ 
behaviors in reality. In some leftist films with high artistic quality, for the sake of 
strengthening the effect of the ideal self, filmmakers would use cinematic strategies to guide 
the audience to fix their identities to the selected protagonists.  
For Street Angel, in the sequence portraying two processions of marching bands at a 
wedding ceremony, the filmmakers use a series of shots that are, according to Ma Ning’s 
statement, “without a designed point of authority.”87 The series uses montage to connect the 
separate shots in a point-of-view perspective similar to the omniscient view used in 
Hollywood films. However, this omniscience is interrupted by several subjective points of 
view between the protagonists. Interestingly, for this omniscient point of view, most of the 
Chinese spectators in the images are frozen while the protagonists who occupy the subjective 
points of view are active. Ma Ning interprets these frozen Chinese spectators as “the typical 
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Chinese spectators similar to Lu Xun’s description.”88 Lu Xun’s spectator reveals his ironic 
attitude towards Chinese people’s apathy, clumsiness and insensitivity. I propose, however, 
that—besides being satirical—this contrast between the frozen and active images also helps 
to sway the audience’s opinion. The two POV structures represent two positions offered to 
the audience—omniscience or that of the protagonists. The contrast between scenes in the 
two POV structures implies that in the omniscient POV, the audience can only see such 
frozen images like the Chinese spectators. From the protagonists’ POV, however, the 
audience will see a film full of actions. This contrast steers the audience to prefer the 
protagonists’ position. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the audience identifies with the 
protagonists as the “ideal self.” This is vital to achieve the goal of educating the masses to 
follow and imitate the behaviors of the protagonists in their own lives after they watch this 
film. 
But not all the protagonists share the same function. Unlike the male principals who 
obtain a position of subjectivity, the female lead is endowed with a particular function: she 
becomes an object and furthermore the incarnation of China. Xiao Hong’s tragic life mainly 
centers on her close connection to tradition. She is completely controlled by her adoptive 
father, a master musician, who just views her as a tool to make money. In fact, Xiao Hong is 
in a traditional or feudal relationship with the musician, which most folk artists complied 
with. In this relationship, the musician obtains the authority as a father; meanwhile, he views 
Xiao Hong as a tool to make money instead of an independent subject. In this sense, the 
musician becomes a symbol of the feudal power. This feudal relationship restricts Xiao Hong 
and reduces her to be a product without subjectivity. In order to strengthen the sense of 
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tradition, both the costumes of Xiao Hong and the musician are traditional. In order to 
maintain his authority, the musician in the subsequent plot confines Xiao Hong to tradition 
through an arranged marriage. The beautiful and innocent girl who leads a tragic life mainly 
resulting from the feudal traditions, undoubtedly, may kindle audiences’ sympathy. 
Moreover, the relationship between the adoptive father and Xiao Hong in the film may have 
a possible overtone referring to the relationship between the KMT and China. Being the 
ruling party, the KMT, as the musician does to Xiao Hong, intended to keep Chinese society 
in a more traditional Confucian mode vis-à-vis the New Life Movement, (although this 
project did contain a few elements of modernization). In this sense, Xiao Hong’s life may 
resonate with China’s destiny. 
Actually, in the episode in which she sings her “Song of the Four Seasons” in a tavern, 
Xiao Hong’s relation with China becomes unambiguous: by a process of objectification, 
Xiao Hong becomes the incarnation of China. Her “Song of the Four Seasons” accompanies 
images from the past showing the war in northeast China, the loss of her hometown, and 
people roaming in distant areas—but the scenes are inserted into the present space-time. In 
Ma’s statement, those images reveal that her subjectivity is “inter-subjective,”89 and her 
vision “has a degree of omniscience and omnipresence beyond individual subjectivity;”90 
thus, she should be seen as a representative of Mother China. This sequence is crucial to 
study Xiao Hong’s symbolic meaning and her relationship with the nation. However, it is 
suspect to describe her vision as having a degree of omnipresence. The flashback is made up 
of objective shots, including the scenes of wars and Xiao Hong’s images. Considering the 
flashback part is a component of Xiao Hong’s song, the entire episode may be interpreted as: 
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Xiao Hong as a subject in the present space-time sees herself as an object in her own 
flashback. In this sense, Xiao Hong’s subjectivity may, as Ma claims, be inter-subjective and 
have a degree of omniscience. However, considering the ownership of the POV in the present 
space-time, the function of the entire montage sequence may change. In the present space-
time, Xiao Hong consciously escapes to directly face the camera and turns her eyes to focus 
on her hair (Figure 4). 
                      
                  Figure 4. Xiao Hong escapes to directly face the camera when she is singing 
Her action leaves her away from occupying the POV in the flashback. In other words, the 
flashback scenes may be omniscient, but they do not belong to Xiao Hong. In addition, her 
face in close up makes her become the object in the present space-time from the audience’s 
POV. Therefore, rather than obtaining a special subjectivity, in both the flashback and 
present space-time Xiao Hong is objectified. As an object, Xiao Hong leaves away from 
sharing the same position of the audience.  
Indeed, Xiao Hong’s objectification makes her become the incarnation of China. I use 
the term “incarnation” instead of “representative,” since I hope to highlight that both Xiao 
Hong and China are recipients (objects) of national pains and crises, instead of witnesses 
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(subjects). National pain directly works on Xiao Hong’s personal life as they do on China’s 
territory. Using the first section of montage sequence in this flashback as an example.  
7:14 Xiao Hong, with her back to the camera, is embroidering beside the window 
(Figure 5) 
            
                                           Figure 5. Xiao Hong is embroidering 
7:26 A bomb is exploding in close up (Figure 6) 
           
                                  Figure 6. A bomb is exploding 
7:28 Xiao Hong, with her back to the camera, hears something, stops embroidering, and 
goes to look out of the window (Figure 7) 
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                                    Figure 7. Xiao Hong hears the noise outside 
7:33 A series of scenes of a war (Figure 8) 
           
                                                      Figure 8. Scenes of wars 
The montage combines those irrelative scenes together and adds a subject-object 
relationship to them: the impersonal shots of wars and bombs become the objects of Xiao 
Hong’s version. The whole montage depicts that it is Xiao Hong who is experiencing the 
pains of the war. Moreover, in the sound track, the lyrics “Suddenly, a blast of merciless 
beatings, which break up the mandarin ducks,” which describe the separation of a couple, 
  
54 
accompanying with the images of wars and bomb create a montage, which intertwines a 
personal trauma (separation from her lover) with a national crisis (war). In other words, Xiao 
Hong’s personal tragedy works as a metonymy of the traumatic national history, and she also 
becomes the direct recipient of the national crisis. In this sense, Xiao Hong becomes the 
incarnation of China. 
As the incarnation of China, Xiao Hong’s singing can be interpreted as the nation’s call 
for the awakening of masculinity. On the surface, her performance of “The Wandering Song” 
depicts a love story: a girl sings a song for her lover. But the connotation behind the 
superficial theme refers to a strategic metaphor for patriotism. Two significant topics 
composed of four core elements reappear in the lyrics of this song: a homeless girl (personal 
pain) is calling for her lover’s attention (masculinity), and she promises to be loyal (loyalty) 
to her lover forever (love). In addition to the four elements, the appearance of the actress 
makes the role Xiao Hong become more attractive. As a 1930s’ critic indicated, “when she 
sings “The Wandering Song,” and plays with a small handkerchief, how beautiful she is!”91 
Therefore the whole performance of the song portrays a girl, who uses her feminine charms, 
pain and loyalty to her lover as bait to attract men’s attention for evoking a Freudian rescue 
fantasy. Considering Xiao Hong’s symbolic function as the incarnation of China, the 
performance becomes a strategy, which makes patriotism appealing to male subjects. 
Accordingly, the filmmakers construct an allegory involving the audiences’ engagement. 
They imperceptibly guide and educate the audience to fix their identities to male protagonists 
and furthermore defend and save China in the reality, as the male principals do to Xiao Hong 
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in the film. Subsequently, the filmmakers need to address the main issue: how to save China, 
or which road did China need to choose in order to survive? 
2. Choice Between Modernity and Tradition 
It may be considered a platitude that leftist films show the contrast between the city and 
the countryside. For instance, most of Cai Chusheng’s films portray the beauty of the 
countryside and the corruption of city life. Sun Yu’s films, like Big Road and Wild Rose, also 
imply that the girl in the city who came from the countryside is innocent and attractive. 
Breaking away from this cliché, Yuan’s film offers an alternative angle that portrays the 
underground of the city, where life is semi-traditional and semi-modern. Unlike rural areas, 
the underground of the city has a closer connection to the city’s modernity, which can 
centralize the contents of the film on discussing topics like modern, modernity and 
modernization. Based on the comparison between the city and its underground areas, Yuan 
constructs a social allegory to symbolize China’s situation in the 1930s and also brings up the 
main issue of China choosing its own type of modernity over traditionalism and a completely 
Westernized modernity. 
Different from modern city life, which is completely contemporized like the West, both 
traditional and modern elements coexist in the underground of the city. Ma Ning interprets 
the two processions in the peculiar wedding ceremony as showing “the social milieu of China 
as semi-feudal and semi-colonial state with divided foreign influences.”92 There is no doubt 
that the two processions hint at the foreign influence, but the term semi-colonial strongly 
implies the control of the colonized country by the colonial ruler. Although this term may 
help Ma develop his statement on radical characteristics of the leftist film movement, it is 
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hard to say in this sequence if the two processions are conveying this radical emotion. Even 
in the rest of the film, filmmakers seldom highlight semi-colonial features of Chinese society. 
In addition, the terms semi-colonial and semi-feudal—matching the CCP’s ideological 
discourse in this period—may lead one back to the trap of the ideological approach. 
Considering these facts, I argue that instead of the term semi-colonial, using semi-traditional 
and semi-modern, which have no strong ideological color, are more suitable to describe not 
only the meaning of the film sequence but also its metaphorical subject—Chinese society. 
As Ma indicates, in this sequence “camera displacement creates a series of mismatches 
such that the procession seems to continually crisscross its own path.”93 These mismatches 
result in “confusion and contradiction,”94 which in Ma’s interpretation, symbolizes the 
1930s’ Chinese situation. Furthermore, viewing the sequence as a whole, the mismatches are 
in a dynamic process and therefore obtain a metaphorical meaning to imply a possible choice 
about the future road of China. The mismatches appear repeatedly in the shots of the Chinese 
procession. The montage displaying the movements of the Chinese procession to the left or 
right side of the screen forms an illusion that this procession is repeatedly crisscrossing its 
own path, an allegory symbolizing China’s similar situation. In the middle of the sequence, 
two shots—one showing the Chinese procession moving to the left and the other showing the 
Western procession moving to the right—imply a meeting between China and the West. 
After this meeting, the mismatches disappear. Instead, the Western procession melds into the 
Chinese one. Without hesitation, the mixed procession moves forward. Considering the 
general meaning of modern as progressive and traditional as backward in a Chinese context, 
the movement of the procession implies the director’s attitude about the future of China—
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that China should at least accept the influence of modernization. As the story unfolds, the 
filmmakers use the behavior of the protagonists to affirm their inclination towards modernity.  
Although the boundary between the city and its underworld—obstructing interaction 
between the two worlds—is explicitly revealed in the image, the protagonists living in the 
underground of the city still try their best to enter the modern city. In the sequence when 
Xiao Hong goes to Xiao Chen and his sworn brother Lao Wang’s house, they find a 
newspaper advertisement about a dance hall, and all three decide to secretly explore this 
exotic world. Their first attempt fails, however, because of Xiao Yun’s obstruction. Here, 
Yuan shows his different attitude towards a Western modern symbol—the dance hall—rather 
than another leftist icon, Cai Chusheng. According to Pickowicz’s study, the dance in Cai’s 
films is a symbol that “is presented as a microcosm of Western civilization … is 
transparently corrupt, decadent and thoroughly alien to Chinese values.”95 However, in Street 
Angel, Yuan seemingly re-evaluates the cultural meaning of this modern place. At least, he 
replaces Cai’s severe blame for this space. One may interpret this nonconformity as follows: 
thanks to Xiao Yun’s obstruction, the protagonists can be prevented from the Western 
“spiritual pollution.”96 However, this reason fails to explain the protagonists’ persistent 
efforts to be close to the modern city.  
Xiao Chen and Lao Wang finally enter the modern city, hoping to find help from a 
lawyer. They fail once again and then return back to the city’s underworld due to their 
financial shortage. There is no doubt that in their first contact with the city, its modernity, 
convenience and comfort shock them. On the other hand, the darkness of the modern city, 
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like the apathy and materialism also make them feel disappointed. After they discover just 
how ineffective the modern legal system really is, they decide to escape from the control of 
Xiao Hong’s adoptive father—or the feudal power. It’s interesting that after they do escape 
from the control of feudal power, the image of skyscrapers—a symbol of modernity—
appears outside their window in the new house (Figure 9). 
                
                          Figure 9. The image of skyscrapers outside the winder 
Although in the previous scenes many shots show the youths moving in front of the window, 
one never sees the skyscrapers. The appearance of the skyscrapers suggests that the 
protagonists are moving to a place closer to the city, even though they also feel upset by their 
first contact with the modern city in the law office. Although the ending sequence of the film, 
which revisits the boundary between the city and its underworld, implies the difficulty the 
youths face entering the city because of their impoverishment, it’s apparent that these youths 
have a strong desire to enter the city to become urban dwellers.  
Furthermore, after the protagonists move closer to the city, Xiao Hong’s appearance 
begins to change. Before they flee, Xiao Hong is in cheongsam and wearing her hair in a pair 
of braids, a traditional style for Chinese girls. However, after they get closer to the city, Xiao 
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Chen’s friend helps Xiao Hong change her hairstyle to a more fashionable style of short, 
curly hair—similar to the style worn by city girls. Considering her symbolic meaning, Xiao 
Hong’s active transformation becomes a metaphor that implies that after saving China (Xiao 
Hong) from the control of the feudal power (the musician), the Chinese people (Xiao Chen 
and his friends) need to modernize it. As with the Western-style curly hair, the modernization 
of China should also refer to Western modernity. This does not mean, however, that China 
should completely Westernize, as the May Fourth elites claimed in the 1920s. As Xiao 
Hong’s new style reveals, filmmakers seemingly propose that China needs to absorb 
beneficial elements from both traditional and Western modern cultures. Therefore through 
the behavior and actions of those protagonists in the film, the audience who shares the same 
position as the male protagonists imperceptibly get an education about the direction of their 
future life: They needed to promote China to move forward and find an alternative road to 
modernize it. 
3. How to Be A Modern Subject 
In addition to presenting the idea that China needs to find a solution to its national crisis 
by shifting to modernity, filmmakers also educate the masses on how to live as a modern 
subject in the new modern life by the behavior of the protagonists. In the beginning of the 
film, Yuan appropriates a series of montage from his other film Scenes of City Life (Dushi 
fengguang都市风光, 1935). The sequence lasting for two minutes depicts scenes of modern 
Shanghai, an attractive metropolis filled with Western modern elements such as skyscrapers, 
cars, dance halls, foreign restaurants, English words, banks, and money. Besides being an 
exotic scene, this sequence also tries to educate the audience on how to live in a modern 
society. Guo-Juin Hong indicates that in 1930s’ Shanghai, intellectuals attempted this 
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through various ways, such as using the modern time to “tell a story of becoming a modern 
subject.”97 Yuan also uses this clip to achieve the same goal. The time of a whole day in the 
city is divided into three parts: starlit nighttime, daytime, and carnival evening. For the 
nighttime scenes, the screens are filled with restaurant and hotel signs, suggesting people 
need to be sleeping and resting at this period of time. Most of the signs are written in both 
Chinese and English, and they suggest a global background with lines like “Indian curry” and 
“Far East.” Subsequent scenes show flying pigeons, daytime stars, friends walking in a park, 
people going to work, and people participating in religious activities—which clearly refers to 
foreign religions. A close-up of a clock reveals that the day in the city culminates at around 
8:30 p.m. with parties in magnificent dance halls. This montage sequence conveys the idea 
that if audiences hope to live the modern life and be modern subjects, and then they need to 
plan their days according to this modern rhythm (Figure 10). 
                
                          Figure 10. Modern rhythm  
The training on this modern rhythm is common in other leftist films. In Zhang 
Shichuan’s The Tenderness Market, the clock, which shows 6:05 pm repeatedly appears in 
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the close-up to mark the time when people come off duty. In Crossroads, Ms. Yang finishes 
work at about 6:00 pm. In Ying Yunwei’s Plunder of Peach and Plum, since the female 
protagonist Li Lilin does not come back home at about 5:50 pm, her husband begins to be 
worried. The clock in close shot and the worrying of her husband imply that in generally, the 
respectable women with family should go home before this time (around 5:50 pm), which 
may be a social consensus. Considering the party time from 8:30 pm shown in the clip of 
Scenes of City life, these modern times, which are repeatedly emphasized in different films, 
construct a living schedule to educate the masses how to live in modern city.  
In addition to the modern rhythm, two other strategies—newspapers and military—also 
are regarded as necessary means, which should be obtained by a modern subject. According 
to Ma Ning, the newspaper headlines shown in the film can be interpreted as “journalistic 
discourse,”98 which represents “Chinese bourgeoisie, [because of its] emphasis on individual 
rights and supremacy of law.”99 In this film, however, the information published in the 
newspaper is always either incomplete or inaccurate. Ma indicates that the incomplete 
information reveals that “leftist filmmakers…do not necessarily regard newspaper headlines 
as a reliable source of information.”100 Even though the newspaper always shows incomplete 
information, an interesting phenomenon is: the protagonists still rely on newspapers to find 
solutions for their living issues after they fail so many times.  
Given this fact, I argue that in Street Angel, newspapers have the significant function of 
offering reliable information and educating ordinary people on how to live in the modern 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
98 Ma, “The Textual and Critical Difference of Being Radical,” 103. 
 
99 Ibid. 
 
100 Ibid., 105–106. 
 
  
62 
world. First, the information offered by the newspaper headlines is various and 
comprehensive. They include: social problems, such as prostitution issues; national crises, 
like the Sino-Japanese war in northeastern China; and entertainment advertisements, like the 
poster for the leftist film, Life and Death (Shengsi tongxin生死同心, dir. Ying 
Yunwei,1936). The inaccuracy of the information shown in the close-up can be interpreted as 
an intended strategy to avoid censorship. Although they fail several times relying on the 
methods offered on the newspapers, they still use the way which they find on the newspaper 
successfully saved Xiao Hong from her tragic life. In addition, Lao Wang’s compulsion to 
search for solutions in the newspaper when he encounters any problem is portrayed as a 
model for the audience. Lao Wang’s aggressive and repetitive actions (Figure 11) underscore 
that if the masses hope to be close to the modern city as Lao Wang is, then they should get 
accustomed to reading newspapers and relying on the various types of information offered by 
newspapers to solve their real-life personal problems.  
             
                                 Figure 11. Finding ways on newspapers     
Another way to enter into the modern society is the military. In the film, Xiao Chen and 
his sworn brothers perform a shadow play for Xiao Hong in order to reassure her that she 
will be able to escape. The shadow play performance (Figure 12) hints at the uprisings of the 
  
63 
masses, more reflective of the CCP’s ideology. Considering the metaphorical meaning of 
Xiao Hong, this performance can be interpreted as propaganda that if the ordinary Chinese 
people want to defend the nation-state, they should get together to appeal to the military and 
the revolutionary masses. However, according to Ma, this performance also can be 
appropriated into the KMT’s ideology as the “reenactment of the revolution of the Northern 
Expedition.”101 This example reaffirms that leftist films do have the characteristic of 
equivocality. As a cultural event, leftist film texts are open to interpretations from the 
political perspective. 
                
                    Figure 12. Shadow play performance 
B. Case II: Big Road 
Now I turn my eyes to Sun Yu’s Big Road to analyze the dynamic discussion and 
different presentation forms. In this film, Sun Yu portrays a story about six young men--Jin 
Ge and his friends. Because of the abuse they receive from the capitalists in the city, they 
move to the countryside to join in a national road-building project, which will be used to 
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support the KMT’s fight against their enemies. In the beautiful hinterland, they make friends 
with two special girls—Mo Li, a vagrant singer of the flower drum song, and Ding Xiang, 
the daughter of the boss in a small tavern. But their life in the rural area is not as peaceful as 
they think. Enemies offer a bribe to the local leader, Assistant Hu, in order to obstruct the 
road-building project. Since Jin and his friends refuse Hu’s bribe and insist on finishing the 
road, Hu imprisons them. With the help of the two girls, other road workers and a general, 
the six young men are rescued. When the road is almost done, the enemies suddenly begin to 
attack the construction site attempting to destroy the new road. The six young men and Mo 
Li die in the attack, but the road is finally completed. 
1. Another Narrative Strategy to Praise Urbanization 
On the surface, this film may be interpreted as an exception to my above statement about 
people staying in the modern city instead of going to the countryside. For instance the 
protagonists claim, “Go to the countryside! Do not stay and work in the city where you are 
controlled by others! I agree.” All of the protagonists go to the countryside. It is clear that the 
filmmakers try to highlight the beauty and harmony of the countryside. However, I argue that 
this film still cannot be seen as an exception. On the contrary, it can also be seen as following 
my statement that people reject the notion of going back to tradition. As director Sun Yu 
indicated, those young men find that “building roads for imperialists will strengthen their 
base undoubtedly like sharpening knives for [their] enemies. Then they leave the city and go 
to build a road with a military function in the hinterland. [They try to] destroy the obstacles 
resulting from feudal power and then create a new road for us [i.e., the Chinese people].”102 
As Sun stated, that Jin Ge and his friends journey to the countryside to build a road is a 
  
65 
strategic way to destroy the traditional and feudal obstacles. In the “Trailbreaker Song”, the 
mountains—the obstacles of the road—are described as being composed of “the fossils with 
the history of several million years.” Then the mountain as an obstacle becomes a visual 
symbol of tradition, which has a long history but has become stiff, outdated, and furthermore 
hindered the development of China. Therefore, the intention of the workers described in the 
lyrics that “triggering the explosive buried underground… and bombing the mountains” 
achieves a metaphoric function, which symbolizes destroying the feudal power. In this sense, 
the whole song clearly conveys the negative attitude towards tradition and feudal power.  
In fact, the filmmakers still insist on their positive attitude toward constructing a Chinese 
modernity. Although those male protagonists struggle with serious social issues in the 
modern city like unemployment and capitalist exploitation, it does not mean that they are not 
satisfied with modernization. On the contrary, their behavior of building a road in the rural 
areas is a way to spread urbanization. They bring the symbols of modernity—machinery, for 
example—into the countryside. As the close-up map (Figure 13) reveals, China has 
developed roads nationwide, suggesting a new connection being forged between the 
countryside and the city. 
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                                         Figure 13. Map of road building project 
Besides the filmmakers, ordinary audiences in the 1930s also agreed on the form of 
modernization shown in the film. After watching it, the intellectual Liu Yuying in the 1930s 
indicated that this film was “a great film, which proposes a road-building movement.”103 He 
believed that road building—a crucial project of modernization—was beneficial to the 
society and the construction of a New China. He also encouraged more and more filmmakers 
to produce films like this one.104 Therefore, Sun Yu’s Big Road and Yuan Muzhi’s Street 
Angel both fit in the same frame: exposing the social darkness and looking for an alternative 
modernity. 
2. Portrayals and Functions of Mo Li: A Transcendent Character 
But as I have explained in the previous chapter, the leftist film group also tolerated 
various discourses in the same frame. Many scholars have studied the gender relationship and 
the functions of males and females in Big Road. In Laikwan Pang’s interpretation, Sun’s film, 
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similar to Hollywood films, “portray[s] the growth of an individual man [i.e., Jin Ge].”105 In 
the episode in which Mo Li and Ding Xian see those men bathing in the river and they share 
and eat two watermelons together, Pang appropriates the meaning of a traditional term pogua 
(breaking the watermelon), which contains a sexual implication between men and women, 
and indicates that the female characters, especially Mo Li, “represent less female desire and 
viewing power that the necessary components in men’s maturation processes.”106 Relying on 
Pang’s theory, the behavior of eating watermelons functions as a ritual, which expresses that 
Jin Ge and his male friends have grown up as mature male subjects. But those male 
principals, who have finished their coming-of-age ritual, in the subsequent plots are 
imprisoned, which symbolizes the restriction of their masculinity, and they cannot save 
themselves. Again, it is women who help them. In this sense, the ritual of coming-to-age 
seemingly has not finished. And the men’s coming-of-age process is constantly delayed. 
Until the end when all the male protagonists die, there is no detail to prove that they finish 
their maturation process. They just continue their job to build the road as they always did 
before the pogua ritual. Therefore, we need to reconsider the real relationship between the 
male and female characters and their particular functions. 
I argue that unlike those heroic stories in Hollywood films, Sun’s Big Road cannot be 
interpreted as a film portraying male subjectivity. Instead, men are objectified in this film. A 
peculiar phenomenon in this film is that male characters seldom possess the POV. Mostly, 
their charming faces and strong bodies are exhibited in close-up or medium shots. 
Undoubtedly, those images shock the audience and directly convey Sun Yu’s idea about 
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“[people] have healthy bodies and then will have healthy thoughts.”107 At the same time, 
their faces in close-up, as happens with the beautiful female face in Hollywood films, reduce 
those men to being objects. In the sequence when Mo Li states the features of every male 
character, the montage, in which the first shot shows Mo Li talking to Ding Xian, and then 
the following shot is the face of the man who is being talked about, makes those men become 
objects in Mo Li and Ding Xiang’s views. In this sense, the film, instead of portraying the 
maturation process of a male hero, depicts a series of Chinese male images. Every male 
character represents a particular type of Chinese man in reality. The series of Chinese male 
images not only includes a heroic leader as Jin Ge, but also embrace small figures, who have 
many shortcomings like Zhang Da and Xiao Liuzi. In this sense, those male characters 
function as exhibits (objects) representing strong and healthy masculinity, even though they 
may have more or less shortcomings.  
In Yuan’s film, the female protagonist is an object and functions as the incarnation of 
China. In Sun’s film, however, I argue that the female protagonist Mo Li obtains a degree of 
subjectivity. In both of the two films, a similar episode in which the female principal sings a 
song for the audience appears. Unlike Xiao Hong, Mo Li in a similar episode obtains the 
POV. In the present space-time, Mo Li directly faces the camera and sings her flower drum 
song. Her facial expression conveys the implication that she is looking at the audience 
(Figure 14). The following scene then turns to documentary shots of famine, flood and 
refugees. Since Mo Li’s image never appears, those documentary scenes become impersonal. 
The film editing transforms the impersonal scenes into objects from Mo Li’s POV. 
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                              Figure 14. Mo Li is singing facing to the camera 
But Mo Li may not be the protagonist of those disasters in the documentary shots. The lyrics 
of her song re-confirms that the disasters portrayed in the song are not her personal story. Mo 
Li, in the lyrics, is portrayed as a singer who is leaving Fengyang, where there are continuous 
disasters. And Fengyang becomes a metonymy of China, which was also suffering in various 
catastrophes in the 1930s. But for Mo Li, she does not really experience those disasters. 
While others have to sell children for the sake of survival, she sings, “I do not have sons to 
sell. I take my flower drum and go to other places.” In this sense, Mo Li becomes a witness 
and a narrator seeing the occurrence of national crises. Accordingly, Mo Li obtains a degree 
of subjectivity unlike Yuan’s Xiao Hong. Compared with other characters, Mo Li, as the 
narrator, her POV is omnipresent in this sequence. Her omnipresence gives her an 
opportunity to have a degree of transcendence.  
In addition to her omnipresence, her transcendence also shows in her idealization. Many 
film critics in the 1930s mentioned the portrayal of the character Mo Li, claiming it was not 
realistic and made her as an idealized character.108 A critic even mentioned in 1937, “that Li 
Lili [i.e., the actress who portrays Mo Li] is so flirtatious, canny and brave, that is 
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unbelievable.”109 Moreover, this character in some sense also crosses the gender boundary. It 
is hard to view Mo Li as an ordinary girl, especially when compared with Ding Xiang. Like 
Xiao Hong in Street Angel, Ding Xiang’s enchantment also mainly centers on her beautiful 
appearance, innocent heart, and dulcet song. And both girls are so weak that when she faces 
men’s molestation, she can do nothing but wait for others to help. But Mo Li is different, in 
that she not only shares some of the similar female enchantments as Ding Xiang, but she also 
embraces some of the characteristics beyond her gender. Her appearance is also beautiful and 
attractive. She also knows clearly how to use her enchantment as a powerful tool to save 
herself and others. On the other hand, unlike Ding Xiang’s weakness and shyness, Mo Li is 
unembarrassed and comfortable when she sees men’s naked bodies. In some sense, she is 
even more masculine than the men in the film. She leads the workers to save the six 
imprisoned men and strategically uses her female enchantments to approach Assistant Hu 
and obtains the proof of his guilt. She is so strong and powerful that she takes Lao Zhang’s 
place in the men’s road building team after Lao Zhang dies. It is not clear that whether or not 
the filmmakers are trying to reveal a homosexual overtone behind Ding Xiang and Mo Li’s 
relationship. At least, their intimate behavior, like touching one another’s bodies, hugging 
and kissing, between the two girls blurs Mo Li’s gender boundary. Her action when she picks 
up Ding Xiang like a man holding his lover adds a strong sense of masculinity to this 
                                                                                                                                                  
108 Liu Yuying, “After Watching Big Road,” 127. 
 
109 B Shang, “Reviewing Big Road,” (Ping Dalu評《大路》), Annuals of Film (Yingxi nianjian影戲年
鑑), 1934, 127. 
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character. In this sense, Mo Li, beyond the boundary of gender, becomes a character who 
embraces the virtues of both men and women.110 
The transcendence of Mo Li contributes to the construction of an ideal self for the 
audience. Her transcendent gender is accessible for both male and female audiences to fix 
their identities. Therefore, the film, rather than portraying the development of a male hero, 
constructs an allegory centering on Mo Li. Her words, which reveal her attitude towards the 
male protagonists, like “I love all of them,” and her actions, like rescuing the men and 
partaking in their job, become metaphors, which conveys the filmmakers’ purpose to 
motivate the masses to imitate Mo Li’s behavior—finding the beauty of men, loving them, 
rescuing them, releasing their restricted masculinity, and joining in their job to defend the 
nation. The masses should follow Mo Li in transforming their position from witnesses to 
participants.  
The final scene, which shows Jin Ge clasping Mo Li’s hand (Figure 15) before dying in 
some sense functions as a ritual, which confirms that Mo Li has successfully transformed 
from a witness into a participant. If Mo Li is a simple ordinary girl, it may be possible to 
claim an implication about the love behind the two principals’ behavior of holding hands. 
However, if one considers Mo Li’s transcendent gender, the meaning behind this behavior 
may change. In fact, Jin Ge also struggles to hold hands with his other male friends (Figure 
16). It is hard to figure out the difference between Jin Ge’s action towards his male friends 
and towards Mo Li, who has a transcendent gender.  
 
                                                
110 In Cai Chusheng’s New Women, the female worker Aying also obtains the sense of masculinity. But 
Mo Li is still different from Aying, since Mo Li keeps her female enchantments and she can use her 
enchantments to solve problems. On the contrary, Aying ‘s female characteristics are completely cut off. The 
different portrayals and imaginations about new women reveal the coexistence of various discourses in leftist 
film texts.  
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                                          Figure 15. Jin Ge holds Mo Li’s hand 
                   
                                    Figure 16. Jin Ge holds his male friend’s hand 
But this action does have a symbolic meaning. Although the six male principals are depicted 
as objects, they are also active participants in the national modernization. As the leader of the 
road-building team, Jin Ge’s action to clasp Mo Li’s hand as he does with other friends 
undoubtedly expresses his acknowledgement that Mo Li has become a comrade of the six 
men. It confirms the transformation of Mo Li’s position from a witness to a participant in a 
career, which as intellectual Liu Yuying indicated, relates to Chinese people’s livelihood and 
the national survival. Therefore, a significant function of the film is to show how a subject 
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transforms from a witness into a participant. In fact, the audience has already received their 
education. Liu Yuying proposed that more and more experts in the transportation field should 
pay attention to this topic [i.e., road-building]. He also mentioned that intellectuals in the 
fields of politics and economics also should take part in this road-building movement. Liu’s 
proposal indeed shared the similar theme with the film, which appeals to the masses to 
transform from witnesses into participants in the process of modernization.  
In conclusion, Yuan and Sun’s films reveal the existence of a framework in the leftist 
film practice. The main content of the two films relates to social issues in either the 
countryside or the urban city.  Although the filmmakers did not completely satisfy either of 
the two areas, they still showed their inclination to the “modern” and modernization. But this 
modernization is differentiated from the Western one. It is an alternative modernity based on 
personal evaluations of elements from both Chinese traditions and Western modernity. In the 
same framework—exposing social darkness and looking for an alternative modernity, the 
public space worked very well to influence intellectuals to tolerate diverse discussions. 
Filmmakers could employ various cinematic strategies to create their particular allegories to 
educate the masses how to be modern subjects. Therefore, the female object Xiao Hong, who 
is waiting for men’s rescue in Yuan’s film, works as a stimulant to inspire the awakening of 
Chinese masculinity. On the contrary, in Sun’s film, the female protagonist Mo Li achieves a 
transcendent subjectivity and becomes a model subject to encourage the audience to 
transform from witness to participant. Those different cinematic forms and cultural attitudes 
made the leftist film movement become more complex, and at the same time more colorful.    
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V. After Daybreak: Postscript and Conclusion 
In the previous chapters, I explain the general background of the 1930s’ Chinese film 
field. Based on a dialogical transcendence, the film field develops its public space, in which 
intellectuals with different attitudes towards social issues could take part in public discussion 
and negotiation. In fact, according to Zhiwei Xiao, the KMT had already confirmed relatively 
strict film censorship in the 1930s, which was powerful and in some sense could influence 
the foreign concessions’ film release and production.111 Although the KMT’s political leaders 
hoped to use film censorship to control public discourses, the public space in the film field 
still worked very well and left room for diverse discourses to negotiate. Unfortunately, this 
attempt was interrupted by the Japanese invasion. After 1937, when the Japanese military 
occupied Shanghai, most of the participants fled. As a result, the negotiation among various 
discourses and the public space in the film and printing press fields were suspended. In fact, 
in the early age of post-1949, the Communist Party once tried to reopen the public space for 
people to discuss the sustainable future. However, more and more, clear and exclusive 
nationalism and the single-party system emphasizing absolutism clearly defined the 
difference between self and others, which broke off the shared circulatory history. Therefore, 
the public space and dialogical transcendence disappeared.  
As a component of the 1930s film practice, the leftist film movement shared the same 
ability to tolerate alien discourses. On the other hand, the leftist film movement had its own 
distinctiveness. It is tolerance to diverse discourses based on a general frame, including two 
main principles: exposing social darkness and looking for an alternative modernity. In this 
frame, film texts could show dynamic opinions to the definitions of the suitable modernity 
                                                
111 Zhiwei Xiao, “Film Censorship in China (1927-1937)”, PhD Dissertation, 1994. 
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for China and the ways to modernize China. Moreover, in the 1930s, the leftist film 
movement was in a process of canonization. It means filmmakers might actively join in this 
movement. At the same time, some film texts, which mostly could fit in this frame, also were 
categorized as leftist films, even though the filmmakers did not intend to take part in. Even 
though some CCP members participated in this film movement and their film reviews were 
in some sense powerful to change some filmmakers’ political stance, one still needs to pay 
attention to the differences between the 1930s leftist film movement, the 1930s’ CCP and the 
CCP as the ruling party in post-1949. As a tolerant cultural phenomenon, leftist film texts 
absorbed influence from cultures of others and open to interpretation in different angels. The 
ideology of the 1930s’ CCP was not the single discourse, even not the central one.  
But it is not refutable that the so-called alternative road or alternative modernity which 
was being looked for by those participants in the leftist film group left room for the CCP’s 
ideology—Chinese Marxism, since in the 1930s’ background, Chinese Marxism could also 
be seen as an alternative road. In addition to the similar “alternative” characteristic, all the 
means which were employed to tolerate various discourse, like the cinematic strategies 
including open-ending, metaphors and allegories, the ambiguous solutions towards social 
issues, and the exposure of social darkness, which obtain an overtone of the discontented 
attitude towards the KMT’s ruling, gave the CCP opportunities to add their ideological 
discourse on those film texts. After 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) legalized 
only a small group that was guided by the CCP or the pro-CCP portions of the 1930s leftist 
film branch as the progressives and ignored and even blamed other film branches and 
discourses in the same period as wrong and backward. In this sense, it is reasonable that 
scholars always encounter many contradictions and difficulties when they study this 
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historical movement based on the lists defined by the CCP after 1949. For instance, as my 
analysis on Fei Mu and Wu Yonggang’s cases, the CCP’s definition of the 1930s’ leftist film 
movement is futile to explain those peculiar examples. In addition, in order to strengthen the 
close connection between the leadership of the CCP and the film movement, the 
interpretations and reviews of those 1930s’ film texts are politicalized in the post-1949 
period. In other words, the CCP’s official explanations of those films guide and restrict 
discourses in a political direction, which is beneficial to the CCP’s ideology. Therefore, the 
diversity and richness of the 1930s film texts are reduced. In this sense, one needs to clarify 
that the 1930s leftist film movement actually had a wider scope and richer cultural meanings 
than the leftist film movement defined by the CCP after the 1949.   
The CCP’s reduction of the complexity of history in the cultural field in the period of 
pre-1949, actually, leaves many blanks. Although the 1930s film movement was interrupted 
by wars and had not had a winner-loser result, the official historical book of the PRC—
Cheng Jihua’s The Development History of Chinese Film—implied and legalized the success 
of the leftist film branch. Actually, this historical statement leaves a blank in the period from 
1937 to 1949, when Japan and the KMT occupied China. In order to make the whole history, 
which establishes the CCP’s discourse as the unique truth, be a complete and continuous 
entity, the CCP employs patriotism as an effective strategy. They treat films without 
influence from the CCP as non-Chinese films and simply summarize the period from 1937–
1949, when the CCP had no ability to support enough film production, as a period of 
hibernation. It means, motivated by patriotism, Chinese filmmakers refused to follow others’ 
orders to produce non-Chinese films, but they were still there and waited for a chance to 
make a contribution to developing Chinese films. Those filmmakers’ existence and the 
ambiguous concepts of patriotism and China helped to hide ruptures and build an illusion of 
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the continuity of the CCP’s history. As a result, the dialogical transcendence germinated in 
the 1930s and its significant influence and benefits were ignored and forgotten.  
At the same time, the new exclusive nationalism fueled Chinese people to compete with 
others. Although from a political and ideological perspective, the CCP is concerned with 
Western spiritual pollution, in other aspects, Western-style industrial capitalism attracted 
people’s attention and occupied a powerful position. Even in the Cultural Revolution, under 
the surface of anti-West, most of the national projects tried to industrialize China. In a sense, 
competition led China to become imperceptibly Westernized, and the Open Door Policy may 
just have made an existing tendency of Westernization public and rapidly pushed it forward. 
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Appendix 
Filmography 
1. Wild Rose (Ye meigui野玫瑰) Dir. Sun Yu, 1932. 
2. Share the Burden of the National Crisis (Gongfu guonan共赴國難) Dir. Sun Yu, 
1932. 
3. Conscienceless (Rendao 人道) Dir. Bu Wancang, 1932. 
4. Pink Dream (Fenhongse de meng粉紅色的夢) Dir. Cai Chusheng, 1932. 
5. Daybreak (Tianming天明) Dir. Sun Yu, 1933. 
6. The Little Toy (Xiao wanyi小玩意) Dir. Sun Yu, 1933. 
7. Night in the City (Chengshi zhiye城市之夜) Dir. Fei Mu, 1933. 
8. Spring Silkworms (Chuncan春蠶) Dir. Cheng Bugao, 1933. 
9. Torrent (Kuangliu狂流) Dir. Cheng Bugao, 1933. 
10. Tenderness Market (Zhifen shichang脂粉市場) Dir. Zhang Shichuan, 1933. 
11. Shanghai 24 Hours (Shanghai ershisi xiaoshi上海二十四小時) Dir. Shen Xiling, 
1933. 
12. Life (Rensheng, 人生) Dir. Fei Mu, 1934. 
13. . A Sea of Fragrant Snow (Xiangxuehai香雪海) Dir. Fei Mu, 1934. 
14. Queen of Sports (Tiyu huanghou體育皇后) Dir. Sun Yu, 1934. 
15. Big Road (Dalu大路) Dir. Sun Yu, 1934. 
16. Goddess (Shennü神女) Dir. Wu Yonggang, 1934. 
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17. New Women (Xin nüxing新女性) Dir. Cai Chusheng, 1934. 
18. Song of the Fisherman (Yuguang qu漁光曲) Dir. Cai Chusheng, 1934. 
19. Plunder of Peach and Plum (Taoli jie桃李劫) Dir. Ying Yunwei, 1934. 
20. National Customs (Guofeng國風) Dir. Luo Mingyou and Zhu Shilin, 1935. 
21. A Little Angel (Xiao tianshi小天使) Dir. Wu Yonggang, 1935. 
22. A Song of China (Tianlun天輪) Dir. Fei Mu, 1935. 
23. Children of Trouble Time (Fengyun ernü風雲兒女) Dir. Xu Xingzhi, 1935. 
24. Scenes of City Life (Dushi fengguang都市风光) Dir. Yuan Muzhi, 1935. 
25. Waves Washing the Sand (Langtaosha浪淘沙) Dir. Wu Yonggang, 1936. 
26. A Lamb Astray (Mitu de gaoyang迷途的羔羊) Dir. Cai Chusheng, 1936. 
27. The Wolf Hill (Langshan diexue ji狼山喋血記) Dir. Fei Mu, 1936. 
28. Tomboy (Huashen guniang化身姑娘) Dir. Fang Peilin, 1936. 
29. Map of Treasures (Baibao tu百寶圖) Dir. Yue Feng, 1936. 
30. Murder in the Wedding (Xinhun da xue’an新婚大血案) Dir. Wang Cilong, 1936. 
31. Life and Death (Shengsi tongxin生死同心) Dir. Ying Yunwei, 1936. 
32. A Mystical Flower (Shenmi zhihua神秘之花) Dir. Yue Feng, 1937. 
33. Crossroads (Shizi jietou十字街頭) Dir. Shen Xiling, 1937. 
34. Street Angel (Malu tianshi馬路天使) Dir. Yuan Muzhi, 1937. 
